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Abstract 
Stimulus-driven timing is a fundamental aspect of human and animal behavior.  This type 
of timing can be subdivided into three principal axes: interval generation, storage, and 
evaluation.  In this thesis, we present results related to each of these axes and describe their 
implications for how we understand timed behavior.  In Chapter 2, we address interval 
generation, which is the process of creating an internal representation of an ongoing 
temporal interval.  While several studies have found evidence for neural oscillators which 
may subserve this function, it has remained an open question whether such a mechanism 
can be useful for timing at even the lowest level of cortex.  To address this question, we 
analyze electrophysiological data collected from rats performing a timing task and find 
evidence that, indeed, timed reward-seeking behavior tracks oscillatory states in primary 
visual cortex.  This kind of finding raises an important question: how is this temporal 
information stored after the interval has been generated?  This process is called interval 
storage, and we address the sources of noise that might corrupt it in Chapter 3.  Specifically, 
we devise a novel timing task for humans (BiCaP) to address whether memory biases can 
account for performance on a classification task, in which a subject must decide whether a 
test interval is more similar to one or another reference interval.  We find that they do, and 
argue that these sources of noise must be accounted for in theories of timing.  In Chapter 
4, we deal with interval evaluation which is the process of using this stored temporal 
information to make valuation decisions.  We study this process through the lens of 
foraging behavior.  Specifically, we develop and test a framework that rationalizes 
observed spatial search patterns of wild animals and humans by accounting for the temporal 
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information they gather about their environment, and how they discount delayed rewards 
(temporal discounting).  Lastly, in Chapter 5, we discuss how these processes are integrated 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In order to survive, animals must execute precise responses to environmental stimuli.  
Doing so requires knowledge of what a stimulus means: both in terms of what it predicts 
and when.  In this thesis, we focus on the temporal dimension and investigate the neural 
mechanisms underlying timed behaviors.  In particular, we concentrate on visually-guided 
timed behaviors.  
In studying timing, there are a variety of temporal ranges to choose from.  At one extreme, 
animals can respond subconsciously in the millisecond range, such as when walking is 
perturbed by an unexpected stimulus but balance is maintained.  At another extreme, 
biological processes across a wide range of organisms follow circadian rhythms which take 
hours or days to adapt to an environmental change (3).  Neither of these processes occurs 
at a conscious level.  Timing at the hundreds of milliseconds to seconds level, on the other 
hand, often involves conscious decision-making and voluntary actions (4, 5) and is 
generally thought to engage distinct neural mechanisms (6).  Here, we are interested in the 
cognitive aspect of timing, and thus focus on interval timing in the seconds range. 
Even within this temporal range, several distinct neural processes are engaged during timed 
behaviors (7–10).  With respect to stimulus-driven behaviors, internally generating 
temporal intervals following a visual stimulus is critical.  Note that generation of a temporal 
interval at the neural level may occur even in the presence or absence of an overt behavior.  
For instance, an animal may be instructed to produce or withhold a lever press for a certain 
duration following a stimulus;  in either case, the animal must be able to internally generate 
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the interval.  In some cases, interval generation would not suffice to accomplish the task at 
hand.  Imagine, for instance, that an animal must compare the duration of an ongoing, cued 
interval to a remembered interval.  In that case, the animal has to store that previous 
temporal interval in memory to be able to make a comparison to the current interval (which 
would also have to be translated into some common currency).  This process is interval 
storage, and in many real-world behaviors it must be used in combination with interval 
generation to successfully accomplish a timed behavior.  Finally, successful decision-
making often relies on incorporating temporal information, even if the decision ultimately 
does not occur on a temporal axis.  For instance, choosing between an option A and an 
option B may not actually require a direct temporal comparison—but information about 
temporal intervals associated with A and B (e.g. I will receive reward sooner if I choose 
option A) can play a role in the decision.  We define this axis of timing as “evaluation”.  In 
sum, we will address how cognitively-complex animals are able to generate, store, and 
evaluate temporal intervals in the seconds range during visually-guided decisions. 
 
1.1 Generating temporal intervals 
Several behavioral tasks have been brought to bear to better understand the neural 
processes underlying interval generation in humans.  One advantage of using human 
subjects, rather than animals, is that they can be explicitly directed to produce an interval 
of a certain length. This sometimes occurs via verbal instruction (e.g. produce a 4 second 
interval) but more commonly occurs by comparison to a reference interval (e.g. produce 
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an interval that closely matches the interval just shown).  Such non-verbal instruction is 
generally preferred as it eliminates the noise that may arise due to translation from a 
verbally-specified quantity. This may be particularly important, as time and quantity 
processing may rely on highly overlapping mechanisms (11).  In many cases, interval 
production involves pressing a keypad to start and/or stop a temporal interval (start/stop 
task), or pressing and holding a key/lever throughout the interval.  In other instances, 
subjects may be asked to produce rhythmic taps (where the time and variability between 
taps is measured), though this type of task is generally not stimulus-guided and, thus, is not 
of primary concern here.   
Repetitive actions of a different variety are, however, one of the primary methods of 
assessing interval production in animals.  In rodents, for example, the fixed- and peak-
interval procedure are commonly used tasks (12).  In the fixed-interval procedure, a 
stimulus is turned on at the start of a trial, and the animal can turn it off and receive a 
reward by performing some action (e.g. pressing a lever or poking into a reward port) after 
a certain amount of time has passed.  If the animal performs this action during the fixed 
interval, nothing happens, and the animal can try again.  Thus, the rate at which the action 
is performed throughout the trial provides a measurement for the internally generated 
interval.  Similarly, the peak-interval procedure contains fixed-interval trials, but also 
interleaves probe trials in which the action neither terminates the stimulus nor results in 
reward.  In this task, the time during which level-pressing is highest is considered to 
correspond to the peak of reward expectation, whereas presses around this time offer a 
sense of the variability associated with this estimate.  While useful, these tasks do not 
require precise timing: the action can occur any time following the stimulus.  To address 
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this, penalties for poor timing (e.g. performing an action well before or after a certain 
interval) may be imposed (13).  Such a task is described in Chapter 2. 
In order to generate these timed behaviors, some form of prolonged neural activity is 
required.  For decades, the predominant view was that timing behaviors were subserved by 
a single centralized clock (14).  Lots of experimental evidence in the last decade, however, 
has pointed to the involvement of many distinct brain regions.  This changing perspective 
applies to stimulus-driven timing in particular; whereas associative areas are commonly 
implicated in complex tasks, mounting evidence suggests that motor and sensory regions 
may play key roles in timing as well.   
One neural signature that has been observed in these brain regions is ramping (or step-
wise) changes in firing rate.  Within motor areas, the most anterior region of the 
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) has been shown to represent time in this way.  
Specifically, distinct subsets of neurons show exponential buildup or decay  in firing rates 
as they anticipate a change in the color of a visual stimulus after 2,4, or 8 (15).  This 
supports an earlier finding that ramping in pre-SMA is more gradual when the temporal 
interval is more variable (16).  This type of ramping activity has also been observed in 
premotor cortex.  In one study, ramping was only observed for a long delayed stimulus 
change, but not a short delayed or variable stimulus change (17), perhaps because it would 
not be behaviorally useful in these cases.  Outside of motor cortex, ramping activity has 
been observed in associative areas.  Following studies showing that inactivation of PFC 
impairs timing (18, 19), subsequent recordings from single units with medial PFC showed 
ramping activity whose slope decreased as the duration to be timed increased (20, 21).  
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Within lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP), ramping has been observed for proactively-timed 
(i.e. anticipating a cue change) but not reactive (i.e. responding to a cue change) movements 
(22), and has been shown to track the hazard rate of receiving a visual “go” cue (which is 
a complex, non-linear function) (23).  Interestingly, this differential response to 
proactively-timed and reactive movements has been found in subcortical regions, such as 
the putamen (24) and primate motor thalamus (25).  In addition, rodents performing the 
peak-interval procedure exhibit peaks in activity around the targets durations (of 10 and 40 
seconds) in the striatum (26).  
Perhaps most surprisingly of all, interval generation has even been found in sensory cortex.  
Unlike the aforementioned areas, evidence suggests that sensory cortex processes temporal 
information in a modality-specific manner (27).  For instance, disruption of the posterior 
parietal cortex (through rTMS) interfered with timing in the auditory as well as visual 
domain whereas disruption of area MT/V5 during the same task interfered with timing in 
the visual domain only (28).  Given our emphasis on visually-guided behaviors, we will 
therefore focus on visual cortex.  (Interestingly, supramodal timing has been found in 
primary auditory (but not visual) cortex through a similar TMS disruption procedure (27), 
suggesting that auditory cortex may take on a more diverse role in timing).  
Like in parietal cortex, ramping activity has been found to track the hazard rate of a cue 
change in visual cortex.  This has been observed in fMRI studies in primary visual cortex 
(V1) and V2/V3 (29) and has also been confirmed at the single neuron level within V1 
(where the difference in firing rate between an unattended and attended stimulus closely 
tracked the hazard rate of cue disappearance) (30).  This phenomenon has also been 
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reported in V4 neurons as monkeys anticipated an orientation change (31).  Thus, it seems 
that tracking stimulus anticipation is a general feature of the early visual pathway.   
Still more surprising is that visual cortex has been shown to carry temporal information 
about upcoming non-sensory events (32).  Single unit recordings have revealed that 
neurons in V1 can represent the delay between a visual stimulus and a reward with ramping 
or step-wise changes in firing rate (33–35).  Crucially, the duration of these changes 
depended on the expected duration of the delay period, which was knowable based on 
which of two monocular cues was presented. In these studies, there is no specific timing 
requirement for the animal; in fact, the fastest way to achieve reward is to lick as quickly 
as possible at the reward port following the visual stimulus.  However, a recent study 
imposed a timing requirement and found that this ongoing activity is behaviorally relevant 
(36).  Specifically, the amount of water available at the reward port was changed to be 
dependent on the amount of time waited to lick post-stimulus, according to a ramp-like 
structure (where reward increases gradually and then drops abruptly to zero).  Recordings 
from V1 during this task showed firing rate modulations during the period between the 
stimulus and the action, whose optogenetic perturbation shifted behavioral timing.  
Together, these findings support the view that sensory cortex, and visual cortex in 
particular, is involved in interval generation.  Thus, neural activity realted to interval 
generation seems to be exhibited in many brain regions during visually-cued behaviors. 
In addition to sustained neural activity, oscillatory activity has been linked to timing.  While 
there are fewer studies showing a strong association between this type of activity and 
timing, it has nevertheless been observed in diverse brain regions.  Indeed, oscillations in 
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motor cortex (37) and in prefrontal areas (38) have been linked to temporal prediction of 
visual cues.  As with ramping activity, oscillatory activity in the central midline areas of 
cortex has been found to track the hazard rate of visual cue-change expectation (39).  
Within subcortical regions, oscillatory activity in the putamen has been linked to the inter-
tap duration on rhythmic tapping tasks (40) and start/stop tasks (41).  
Within visual cortex, oscillatory responses in the local field potential (V1) have been 
known about for some time (42, 43), but have only recently have been implicated in timing.  
(Again, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between millisecond and seconds-
range timing; high-frequency oscillations in visual cortex have been strongly implicated in 
facilitating stimulus prediction (44, 45) and feature binding (46, 47)).  As with ramping 
activity, oscillations have been implicated in spanning delay intervals between stimulus 
events (e.g. a cue change); a recent study found that gamma oscillatory power in the local 
field potential (LFP) increased as temporal expectation for a visual fixation point change 
increased (48).  
Also like ramping activity, oscillations in sensory cortex have also been implicated in 
interval generation for non-sensory outcomes.  Recently, LFP theta oscillations from V1 
were analyzed in rats performing a similar task to that described earlier for reward timing 
(49).  Whereas early in training the duration of the theta oscillations correlated with only 
the intensity of the stimulus, late in training it correlated strongly with the average delay to 
reward on a given session.  Overall, these studies point to a role for oscillations in timing 
in primary visual cortex.  It is still unclear, however, whether oscillatory activity in V1 is 
behaviorally meaningful as the tasks used to investigate it do not have an explicit timing 
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requirement; the action to achieve reward was either directly cued (48) or was atemporal 
in nature (i.e. ballistic licking) (49).   
In sum, multiple signals have been implicated in stimulus-driven generation of temporal 
intervals.  These signals exist in many brain regions, from motor cortex to the basal ganglia.  
Surprisingly, timed oscillatory signals have even been observed at the very earliest stages 
of visual processing, including primary visual cortex.  It remains unclear, however, whether 
this activity is behaviorally meaningful.  We address this question in Chapter 3, Interval 
generation and oscillations in primary visual cortex.  
1.2 Storing temporal intervals 
The ability to generate intervals, which we discussed in the previous section, is not 
sufficient for a range of problems.  Say, for instance, a subject was shown two successive 
visual stimuli (Cue A and B) that persisted for different durations and then was asked which 
was longer.  While the subject may have generated an internal representation of the ongoing 
interval, it is not clear how it could be directly stored to make this comparison; 
theoretically, it might be possible to internally generate these intervals and then choose the 
cue associated with the interval that lasts longer.  This seems, implausible, however, as the 
decision can be made near instantaneously.  This suggests that, instead, the intervals 
associated with each cue are stored in some way.  The mechanisms underlying that storage 
process are explored in this chapter.  
In our discussion of interval generation in the preceding section, we described common 
temporal production tasks but glossed over the fact that in many of these tasks it is 
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necessary to have a representation of the target interval.  In the peak-interval procedure, 
for instance, it is necessary to have a sense of when the probability of reward is highest 
(which corresponds to the peak rate of the reward-seeking action).  Therefore, even in 
production tasks, there must be an element of interval storage.  This is especially explicit 
in reproduction tasks, where a standard interval is shown and a subject is required to 
reproduce it.   
But there are also a number of tasks for assessing interval storage which isolate its 
mechanism and do not have an explicit production component.  Interval classification is a 
very common method for this (12).  Though there are many variants, classification tasks 
essentially boil down to the task described above for deciding whether the interval 
associated with cue A or B is longer.   In a typical set up, the subject is shown two reference 
intervals during training and told that one is short and one is long.  During testing, the 
subject is shown a variety of intermediate intervals and must indicate (verbally or with a 
keypress) whether a given test interval is closer to the short or long reference interval.  A 
psychometric curve for the probability of selecting “long” can then be created by averaging 
the decisions for each test interval.  Usually, this results in a sigmoidal curve where test 
intervals at the extremes are easy to discriminate, but intervals near the middle of the two 
reference intervals are challenging.  The bisection point is the temporal value at which the 
subject is equally likely to guess that the interval is short or long.  Accurately determining 
the location of the bisection point is considered critical to understanding temporal storage 
and temporal perception, generally (50).  
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Before delving into the neural mechanisms underlying temporal storage and the location 
of the bisection point, it is important to describe several key insights from behavioral 
observations.  One particularly influential finding in the field of psychology is that changes 
in quantities are perceived in proportion to the magnitude of those quantities.  This is called 
Weber’s law (51) and the intuition is as follows: if one were blindfolded and given a 5kg 
block in one hand, and another block in the other hand, how heavy would that block need 
to be so that it could be reliably distinguished as heavier or lighter?  In other words, what 
is the just-noticeable difference (JND)?  A reasonable guess in this case might be 1kg.  But 
what if, instead, the subject was given a 50kg block; would it be possible to notice this 1kg 
difference?  Probably not.  In fact, Weber’s law suggests that the JND is proportionate to 
the quantity being measured, and would therefore be 5kg in this case.  Though perhaps 
overly simplistic (52), this law has been observed to hold in a variety of contexts (53–55), 
including time perception (56).  (By the same intuition, it is easier to tell the difference 
between 5 and 6 seconds than 50 and 51 seconds.)  Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET) (57), 
one of the most influential theoretical accounts of timing, relies heavily on this observation; 
in fact, the scalar in SET refers to the fact that accuracy in timing is a scalar multiple of the 
quantity being measured.  SET provides a description for how comparisons of sample 
intervals in a classification task take place.  According to SET, the ratio of the test interval 
to the short reference interval is compared to the ratio of the long reference interval to the 
test interval, and the reference interval associated with the smaller of these ratios is chosen.  
This comparison, while perhaps not initially as intuitive as a simple arithmetic comparison, 
is motivated by the fact that the reference intervals are different magnitudes and, thus, are 
associated with different JNDs.  To illustrate this point, it is useful to think about where 
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the bisection point between two reference intervals would lie; if the reference intervals 
were 1 second and 5 seconds, respectively, then SET would predict that the bisection point 
(x) lies below the arithmetic mean of 3 seconds, at ~2.236 seconds, because the ratios of 
1:x and x:5 are equivalent at that point. 
Though SET makes precise predictions about the location of the bisection point, noise can 
arise from its underlying neural processes.  SET proposes a pacemaker-accumulator (PA) 
model for interval storage (57, 58), in which  a pacemaker emits discrete pulses which are 
counted by an accumulator, when a stimulus drives completion of a circuit between them. 
The pacemaker component has been suggested to be driven by a neural oscillator (59), as 
it provides a robust and rhythmic (clock-like) signal.  In this way, production and storage 
mechanisms may be intertwined: a pulse-like oscillator could simultaneously generate an 
interval and send its information to an accumulator for temporary storage.  Following 
reinforcement, the scalar value in the accumulator is written to long-term memory.  Thus, 
the scalar value in memory serves as the representation for the duration of the interval.  
When comparing a test interval to a reference interval, therefore, comparison may occur 
between these scalar quantities.   
Noise can enter this system at multiple levels.  For one, the pacemaker itself may operate 
at different speeds.  If it runs too fast, the interval will be perceived as longer than it is in 
reality but if it runs too slow, or its signal is not robust, the interval will be perceived as too 
short.  Second, the gating mechanism could be faulty, being either too permissive or too 
restrictive.  Third, the long-term memory store could be noisy, such that the scalar quantity 
changes over time.  When doing a comparison, therefore, it would matter how far in the 
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past the scalar quantities were transferred to memory.  Pharmacological studies have, 
indeed, dissociated these effects by showing selective adjustment of clock speed and 
memory processes (60).    
As accurately measuring the bisection point is important for theories of timing (50), it is 
important to account for these sources of noise.  Unfortunately, the bisection point is most 
commonly measured using only classification tasks.  It is, therefore, difficult to control for 
these sources of noise.  One straightforward approach to address this problem is to combine 
a standard classification task with a production task in which subjects must generate what 
they believe to be the standard reference intervals (1). Combining interval generation with 
the classification task in this way affords the opportunity to see how memory biases 
influence storage.  Such a task, along with its results and implications, is described in 
Chapter 4.   
It is important to note that the plausibility of the pacemaker-accumulator model has been 
challenged recently.  Though there have been some demonstrations that implicate its 
conceptual components, such as the pharmacological studies described earlier (60), the 
central critique of the model is that it is not rooted in biological plausibility (61).  
Alternatives to SET have been suggested, such as Killeen’s Behavioral Theory of Timing 
(62) and its derivative, the Learning-to-Time model (63), but, ultimately, they are more 
behaviorally than biologically motivated as well.  Still other models eschew the notion of 
a clock entirely, favoring, instead, a memory-based representation for time-keeping (64); 
this, too, is criticized as biologically implausible (if not conceptually implausible owing to 
the need for an arbitrarily high number of integrators to represent various temporal 
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durations (65)).  The research landscape is, therefore, open to alternative theories firmly 
rooted in biology.   
Along this line, a current, popular alternative to the PA model is the Striatal Beat Frequency 
(SBF) model (66).  In this model, various cortical oscillators are initiated by a start gun 
(proposed to be dopaminergic output from the VTA) and medium spiny neurons (MSNs) 
of the striatum decode their output.  Since all of these oscillators operate at different 
frequencies, they are at different scalar values at the time of reinforcement; therefore, the 
vector of scalar quantities decoded by the striatum at the time of reinforcement serves as 
the memory for the interval.  When trying to time an interval, therefore, the state of the 
ongoing oscillations is compared to this remembered vector and, when matched, the 
interval is terminated.  The SBF is appealing because it has roots in biology and offers a 
mechanism by which intervals can be stored.  It also contains some of the high level 
components that would be subject to noise (e.g. pulse-like oscillators running at various 
speeds and memory for the scalar vector).  However, it is hard to imagine how such a 
storage mechanism could be used for the classic case of interval comparison.  While it 
would be possible to determine whether a given interval were near identical to a prior 
interval, it is unclear how the code could be used to determine whether one interval were 
longer than another (and by how much).  Moreover, at this point, more testing and 
experimental support for SBF is needed (61).   
While it is unclear which timing model is most appropriate for explaining interval storage, 
memory is nevertheless a key component of them all.  In Chapter 4, we will investigate 
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how biases in memory can affect time perception and, consequently, performance on a 
bisection task.  
1.3 Evaluating temporal intervals 
Interval generation and storage are fundamental to timing, but they also subserve decision-
making when no explicit timing behavior is required.  For instance, imagine a subject were 
presented with two cues, A and B, each associated with a different length interval, as 
before.  Having learned those intervals, the subject is offered the option of choosing A or 
B, with the stipulation that reward will be received after waiting the duration of the interval 
associated with that stimulus.  In this case, the subject will probably want to choose the 
stimulus associated with the shorter delay.  Note, however, that this choice is not strictly 
timing based.  Rather, the subject is incorporating temporal information into an ultimate 
decision.  We define this process of making decisions that leverage temporal information 
as interval evaluation.   
The example described above is a simple illustration of a powerful concept in interval 
evaluation: temporal discounting.  Simply put, temporal discounting is the concept that a 
reward displaced farther in time is valued less than when it is imminent.  This concept is 
tightly intertwined with the concept of subjective value, which is the perceived value of an 
outcome to an agent.  Generally speaking, animals have a preference for imminent rewards, 
such that the subjective value of an option decreases as the time to reward increases.  But 
this raises an interesting question: exactly how much does subjective value decrease with 
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time?  That is, what is the shape of the temporal discounting function? And, further, what 
variables, if any, influence it?   
Investigation into the exact form of the temporal discounting function has long been a topic 
of vigorous research.  It is of broad relevance to economists, psychologists, and 
neuroscientists alike because it has deep implications for animal and human behavior.  At 
a high-level, it is generally accepted that the temporal discounting function is 
monotonically decreasing.  At a finer level, the discounting function has traditionally been 
modeled as a decreasing exponential in economics (67).  This is appealing because it is 
simple and intuitive; subjective value declines at a rate proportional to its current value 
which implies that, in absolute terms, the subjective value declines much more rapidly for 
nearby than for distant time points.  Intuitively, this makes sense: you probably care a lot 
more about getting a reward today versus tomorrow than about getting it in ten years versus 
ten years and a day.   
Despite its simplicity and intuitive appeal, however, the exponential discounting model 
fails another test of intuition.   If given the choice between $10 today and $15 in a month, 
it is likely that many people would choose the earlier, smaller option.  (The exact numbers 
are not important; what is important is that there are some values for which there would be 
a preference for the earlier, smaller option.)  Now imagine that these same people were 
given the choice between $10 in a year and $15 in a year and month.  In this case, it would 
not be surprising for many of these same people to choose the $15 in a year and month 
(larger, later option).  Intuitively, the rationale for this is that by adding a year to both 
options, the month delay for the higher option all of a sudden does not seem matter as 
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much.  This kind of behavior would not be predicted by an exponential discounting model, 
however, because in both cases the marginal gain of $5/month is the same. Since the 
subjective discounting rate is constant in an exponential model, the choice of taking 
$5/month should be the same regardless of context.  We can even take this a step further.  
Instead of having two option sets ($10 today vs $15 in a month and $10 in a year vs $15 in 
a year and a month) imagine that we only had the second option: $10 in a year vs $15 in a 
year and a month.  Imagine that subjects are allowed to choose which option they prefer 
today but also adjust their choice until they have received a reward.  As before, an 
individual choosing today might choose $15 in a year and a month (larger, later option).  
But what happens as the day approaches?  In a year from now, the individual will be in the 
exact same situation as for the other option set: choosing between $10 today and $15 
tomorrow.  At that point, the subject may well prefer the $10 option (smaller, earlier 
option).  Therefore, as time elapses, the preferred option may change from the larger, later 
reward to the smaller, earlier reward.  This phenomenon is known as a preference reversal, 
and it has been observed in animals and humans (68).  
To explain these patterns of human and animal behavior, psychologists have developed 
hyperbolic temporal discounting models (67). Compared to an exponential model, a 
hyperbolic model discounts more steeply at early times but less steeply at late times.  
Therefore, in our example comparison between the two option sets, the additional 
$5/month is more steeply discounted today than in a year and, thus, it makes sense to 
choose the smaller, earlier reward in one case ($10 today vs $15 in a month) and the larger, 
later reward in the other ($10 in a year vs $15 in a year and a month).  Similar logic applies 
to the preference reversal: as time elapses, the steepness of discounting changes such that 
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the preference shifts from the larger, later reward (distant in time; gentle discounting) to 
the smaller, earlier reward (near in time; steep discounting).  Generally speaking, 
hyperbolic or hyperbolic-like models have been found to be superior fits to behavioral data 
than exponential models (69, 70).  Recent work has even demonstrated that a hyperbolic-
like discounting function arises naturally from attempting to maximize reward rate, given 
some practical constraints (71).  
Another related body of work deals with maximizing reward rates across space.  For 
decades, ecologists believed that animals foraged according to Brownian motion—that is, 
random walks in their environment (72).  Recent improvements in tracking devices and 
study methodologies led to the realization that, in fact, animals in the wild often do not 
search according to Brownian motion; in fact, their foraging behavior is characterized by 
a higher frequency of long excursions that is well-described by another process: the Lévy 
flight (73, 74).  Essentially, the distribution that arises from this type of process is power-
law distributed.  This finding is of great interest, in part, because these types of 
superdiffusive movement patterns have been observed for a range of physical phenomena 
(75).  Thus, it is surprising that animals seem to abide by these same movement dynamics.  
This finding is of still greater interest as modeling efforts have shown that, in some cases, 
Lévy foraging patterns may be optimal (76).  Recently, however, studies have pointed out 
that this model of optimality is rather brittle—that is, it holds for only very particular and 
unrealistic constraints and parameters (77).  Aside from the fragility of the model itself, 
one of the implicit, unrealistic assumptions underlying this work is that foragers have no 
spatial memory and have no capacity to produce systematic, deterministic searches.   
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Why, then, do foragers seemingly exhibit these Lévy walks?  Might there be a more 
biologically-plausible explanation for them?  Since spatial search clearly involves 
considerable temporal investment, it is reasonable to assume that these temporal costs are 
accounted for in the search algorithm.  Therefore, the insights related to temporal 
discounting can be brought to bear on this problem.  We explore this connection in Chapter 
4, and describe the results and implications for foraging theory.  Thus, we describe a key 
way in which information about temporal intervals is incorporated into decision-making.   
In the following chapters we will describe our insights into visually-guided interval 
generation (Chapter 2), storage (Chapter 3), and evaluation (Chapter 4) in cognitively-
complex animals.  In chapter 5, we will describe how these findings might be integrated 




Chapter 2. Interval generation and oscillations in 
primary visual cortex 
Abstract  
Several lines of recent work have challenged the long-standing belief that sensory cortex, 
and primary visual cortex (V1) in particular, faithfully represents the physical world. One 
such line of work has suggested that V1 can represent even the non-sensory outcomes that 
a stimulus portends.  Indeed, it has been shown that theta oscillations in the local field 
potential (LFP) of V1 can generate the temporal delay between a visual stimulus and an 
expected reward, following conditioning.  We extend this work by presenting evidence that 
these oscillations relate to a stimulus-driven, timing behavior.  In particular, we show that 
with training, high precision and accuracy in timed behavior tracks theta oscillatory power 
in V1.  In addition, we find that the duration of these theta oscillations covaries with the 
time of action execution.  These LFP oscillations are intimately related to spiking responses 
at the single unit level, and, aggregating correlated input across ensembles of increasing 
size increases the predictive power of the timing signal.  Together, these observations 
suggest that oscillatory activity in V1 carries behaviorally-relevant timing information and, 
thus, they extend our understanding of V1’s role in stimulus-driven behaviors and the role 




Generating timed responses to environmental stimuli is crucial for survival.  Such stimulus-
driven behaviors require knowledge of both what to expect and when, and many high-level 
brain areas have been shown to report this information.  Neurons in the striatum (78–82), 
orbitofrontal cortex (83–86), and amygdala (85) have been found to express temporal 
predictions about outcomes, while  dorsolateral premotor cortex (87–89), prefrontal cortex 
(90), and distinct regions of the striatum (91) have been implicated in translating this 
temporal information into action.  Sensory regions like primary visual cortex (V1)—the 
earliest stage of cortical visual processing—are typically regarded as contributing only to 
the first phase of such behaviors: perception (92, 93).  Recent work suggests, however, that 
experience-dependent plasticity in V1 can also give rise to information about when to 
expect an outcome (30, 33).  It has even been shown that such sustained modulations in 
firing rate in V1 contribute to visually-timed behaviors (36).        
A distinct signal in V1—oscillations in the local field potential (LFP)—has also generally 
been interpreted as relaying perceptual information.  One of the key roles for oscillations, 
particularly in the gamma range, may be to enhance binding of visual features to create a 
complete visual percept (46, 47).  Another crucial function of oscillations is to facilitate 
anticipation of upcoming stimuli, though this type of predictive information is often 
reported as lasting on the order of only tens or hundreds of milliseconds (44, 45, 94).  But 
recent observations have also pointed to a role for oscillations in stimulus prediction on the 
order of seconds (30, 48)—the temporal range that is crucial in most cognitive tasks.  
Moreover, it has been found that theta oscillations in the LFP of well-trained rodents are 
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related to even non-sensory outcome predictions (49).  Specifically, the duration of theta 
oscillations in V1 was found to correlate with the average temporal delay between a visual 
stimulus and an expected water reward.  While it is interesting that this distinct signal 
carries temporal information, it is unclear whether it is behaviorally relevant. 
To address this, we analyzed data from a task (36) in which rodents with chronic electrode 
implants in V1 must execute a visually-cued timed action in order to achieve reward.  
Surprisingly, we found that these visual cues evoked theta oscillations in V1 whose 
presence corresponds, on a per trial basis, to trials with improved performance on the 
timing task.  Further, we find that the duration of these oscillations covaries with the time 
of an action, and that this relationship evolves with training.  This theta oscillatory activity 
in the LFP is intimately related to the activity of single units, which can be observed to 
spike in phase with the LFP oscillation.  Specifically, we find that synchronously firing 
neural ensembles carry predictive information about the timing of the action.  Thus, these 
findings further our understanding of V1’s role in stimulus-driven behaviors, provide 
evidence for theoretical accounts of timing which implicate neuronal oscillators (7, 95, 96), 
and extend our knowledge of the role for theta oscillations.  
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2.2 Results: Oscillatory states appear in V1 during a visually-
cued timing task 
Eight wildtype rats were trained on a timing task (36).  In this task, the animal enters a 
nosepoke to initiate a trial, waited a random delay without licking, received a full-field, 
monocular visual stimulus (100ms, green LED, delivered through head-mounted goggles), 
and then licked at a chosen time.  The time that the animal chooses to lick post-stimulus 
determines the amount of reward it obtains on a given trial.  Specifically, the amount of 
water reward available rises linearly with time up until 1.5 seconds, at which point it drops 
to and remains at zero (Figure 1a).  In this way, animals are encouraged to time their licks 
from the visual stimulus so that they fall near, but not past, the peak of the reward ramp. 
Animals trained in this task exhibit cue-evoked theta oscillations in the local field potential 
recordings from the primary visual cortex.  This theta oscillation can be seen in the average 
voltage trace across trials of a session when aligned to stimulus onset, as in Figure 1b.  In 
this example, the average voltage trace exhibits appreciable oscillatory strength for about 
one second following visual stimulation.  Separating the responses per trial (Figure 1c) 
reveals differences in the presence, amplitude, and duration, of theta oscillations across 
trials (Figure 1c, inset).   
In order to quantify these across-trial differences in the presence, amplitude, and duration 
of oscillations, we transform this raw voltage signal into a metric of oscillation strength. 
We focus our analysis within a 4 to 9 Hz frequency range as the preponderance of the signal 
power falls within this range (Figure 1d).  Using this range, we generate a “concentrated 
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energy” score—a measure of the power and purity of the oscillation (methods)—for every 
time point within each trial, as done previously (49) (Figure 1e). Qualitatively, trials with 
large oscillations in voltage (as in Figure 1c) have high concentrated energy scores (as in 
Figure 1e).   
Using these concentrated energy scores, we can investigate how the oscillation strength— 
defined as the mean concentrated energy within a 200-700ms time window—varies across 
trials. By inspection, the probability density function (Figure 1f) of the oscillatory strength 
(Methods) is well described for this session by a bimodal fit (bottom), but not a unimodal 
fit (top), suggesting that there are distinct oscillatory states across trials.  Therefore, we 
compared the quality of each fit by calculating the difference in the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) scores (Methods).  For this example, the ∆AIC is large and negative (~-
99.76) which indicates that the bimodal model is heavily favored over the unimodal model.  
Applying this process across all sessions, we found that the bimodal model is 
overwhelmingly preferred (p=6.87e-66, W414=1186, z=-17.14; Figure 1g, histogram), for 
a variety of metrics (Figure 2a) and when compared to a number of alternative models 
(methods; Figure 2b,c).  Given that trials appear to have either a high or low-power 
oscillation, a threshold (Figure 1h) for sorting trials into “oscillation” and “non-oscillation” 
trials was lawfully applied, as done previously (49).  Ordering the trials from Figure 1c by 
the strength of their oscillation makes the difference in oscillatory power across trials 
visually apparent (Figure 1i).  Finally, we define an oscillation’s duration as the interval 
between the first moment post-cue that the concentrated energy score surpasses this 
threshold for detection and the first moment it falls below it.. 
 24 
 
Figure 1 Oscillatory states are present in V1 during a visually-guided timing task 
a)  Schematic of the task reward structure, in which waiting longer to lick following a 
visual stimulus (time zero) results in a larger volume of water delivery at the lick tube. 
Maximum delivery occurs at 1.5 seconds, and drops to zero thereafter, so that animals must 
time their lick. b) The average voltage trace in the local field potential (LFP) taken from 
an electrode in an example session, with a green bar overlaid to indicate when the visual 
stimulus was on.  Qualitatively, voltage values oscillate for ~1 second post-stimulus. c) 
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Voltage traces per trial for the example session. d) Average time-frequency representation 
of the trials in c. e) Concentrated energy through time of the trials in c. f) The empirical 
probability density function (PDF) for the log(mean concentrated  energy) scores on each 
trial shown in e are shown in blue.  The mean concentrated energy is calculated in a 200-
700ms window post-stimulus. A unimodal Gaussian fit is shown in red (top) and a bimodal 
Gaussian fit is shown in green (bottom).  g) The distribution of the difference in Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) values for each model across all sessions is left-shifted, 
indicating an overall preference for the bimodal model.  The dotted lines around zero are 
the bounds at which the relative likelihood of a model compared to another model is 5%.  
h) Sorted concentrated energy scores for the example session with a dotted line indicating 
the threshold used for determining whether a trial has an oscillation. If the concentrated 
energy score crosses this threshold during the 200-700ms window post-stimulus, it is 
considered to have an oscillation.  i) The raw voltage trace in c sorted by the mean 
concentrated energy in the analysis window on a given trial.  Oscillations were detected 






Figure 2 Trial-by-trial local field potential signals appear bimodal 
a) Empirical probability density function (PDF) for the example in Figure 1 using several 
metrics, including median concentrated energy (top), mean concentrated energy in a late 
analysis window [500-1000ms post-stimulus] (middle), and mean raw energy in a late 
analysis window (bottom). Bimodal Gaussian fits are shown in red. b) The PDF for the 
log(mean concentrated energy) scores in a 200-700ms window post-stimulus with a 
bimodal Gaussian fit (red line, top) and generalized extreme value distribution fit [GEV] 
(red line, bottom). c) The distribution of the difference in Akaike Information Criterion 
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(AIC) values for each model across all sessions is left-shifted, indicating an overall 
preference for the bimodal Gaussian model compared to the GEV model.  The dotted lines 
around zero are the bounds at which the relative likelihood of a model compared to another 
model is 5%. d) Same as in c except that trials are broken down by whether the left eye 




2.3 Results: Lick timing precision and accuracy improve 
during theta oscillation states 
Having defined cue-evoked oscillations and their duration, we next addressed whether 
across-trial differences in the performance of the visually-cued timing behavior tracks with 
changes in the oscillatory state.  To visualize whether performance is related to the 
presence/absence of cue-evoked theta oscillations, we plot, per trial, the time of the first 
lick post-stimulus (the behavioral variable relevant for reward acquisition) atop the 
concentrated energy values (see Figure 3a, top for an example session).  Viewed in this 
way, it is apparent that there is considerable variability in the time of the first lick (white 
squares), but challenging to see what, if any, relationship there is between concentrated 
energy and first lick time.  However, sorting trials by the strength of the oscillation (Figure 
3a, bottom) reveals that there is considerably greater precision in time to initiate licking on 
trials with higher oscillatory power.  To quantify this difference, we compared the temporal 
distribution of first lick times (under five seconds post-stimulus (>95%) to avoid outliers) 
on oscillation and non-oscillation trials (Figure 3b; threshold shown by black dotted line).  
First lick times on oscillation trials tend to be more tightly packed (purple line) than on 
non-oscillation trials (green line).  Indeed, this tends to be the case across all sessions 
recorded on this channel (Figure 3c; p= 4.05e-11, W66= 2139, z= 6.60, two-tailed Wilcoxon 
signed rank test against median=0) and all channels (p=4.8e-54, W408=78618, z=15.48).  
Moreover, the difference in variability across sessions from this channel tends to be more 
pronounced in well-trained animals (i.e. rats performing at least three consecutive sessions 
with a median wait time of one second or greater), compared to naïve, on this channel 
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(methods; p= 0.01, U=5274, z= 2.43, n1=66, n2=75, two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test) and 
across all channels (Figure 3d; p= 1.4062e-15, U=205955, z=7.98, n1=408, n2=457).  Since 
this increased variability on non-oscillation trials predominantly comes from a higher 
fraction of early licks, the central tendency of the lick times across sessions is significantly 
lower on non-oscillation trials (median of ~1006ms) than oscillation trials (median of 
~1103ms) (p=1.51e-14, U=193710, z=7.69, n1=409, n2=410, two-sided Mann-Whitney U-
test).  This means that, on average, licks on oscillation trials occur farther along the ramp, 
where more water is available and, thus, are more accurate.  Therefore, the precision and 
accuracy of timed licks are considerably higher on trials with strong oscillations. 
Since the presence of an oscillation detected at a given electrode covaries with behavioral 
improvements, we hypothesized that there would be larger behavioral improvements 
during trials with more spatially widespread oscillations in V1.  Because we analyzed LFP 
recordings from six channels (3 per hemisphere) per session, we can assess how the timed 
lick behavior varies with the number of electrodes reporting an oscillation on a given trial. 
Variability systematically decreases (Figure 3e, top; p=8.27e-05, slope=-1.91e+04, r=.98) 
and the central tendency systematically increases (p=0.020, slope=23.78ms, r= 0.83) as the 
number of electrodes reporting oscillations grows.  These effects translate into a systematic 
increase in the amount of water obtained per trial (Figure 3e, bottom; p=4.9e-04, 
slope=3.43, r=0.96).  Thus, the greater the spatial extent of cue-evoked oscillations within 
V1, the greater the precision and accuracy of timed reward-seeking actions, and the greater 
the obtained reward. 
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These observations suggest that cue-evoked theta oscillatory states observed in V1 may be 
effectors of timed behavior, but this relationship might arise from other sources.  Because 
there is a random delay period between nosepoke entry and visual stimulus onset, this 
higher variability in lick precision on non-oscillation trials might arise from higher 
variability in time waited prior to the stimulus.  Countering this hypothesis, we find that 
the difference in lick variability between oscillation and non-oscillation trials is 
considerably higher than the difference in wait-time variability (Figure 4b; p=3.94e-30, 
z=11.4, U=201251, n1=414, n2=414, two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test).  Furthermore, the 
lick variability is consistently higher on non-oscillation trials, holding the time waited since 
nosepoke entry constant (Figure 4d).  The same is true when controlling for inter-trial 
interval duration and trial number within session (Figures 4e and f, respectively), 






Figure 3 Lick time precision is higher during oscillatory states. 
 a) Concentrated energy values with first lick times (white squares) post-stimulus overlaid 
for each trial of an example session in chronological order (top) and sorted by oscillation 
duration (bottom).  The dashed black line is the threshold for being categorized as 
oscillatory. b) Empirical cumulative density functions for the first lick times post-stimulus 
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on oscillation (black) and non-oscillation (green) trials in a. c) Histogram of the difference 
in lick variability on oscillation and non-oscillation trials for each session recorded on a 
given electrode. d) Differences in lick time variability on oscillatory and non-oscillatory 
trials for all sessions and channels of trained (blue) and naïve (red) animals. e) (top) Lick 
time variability decreases as the number of electrodes on which an oscillation was detected 
increases for a given trial. Standard error bars shown in black, with regression line in red.  
(bottom) The percent of water obtained over baseline (defined as trials in which no 
oscillations were detected on any electrodes) increases as the number of electrodes showing 







Figure 4 Trial and session statistics do not account for differences in lick precision between 
oscillatory and non-oscillatory trials 
a) Differences between lick time variability on oscillatory and non-oscillatory trials across 
all sessions and channels. b) Differences in lick time variability (blue) are considerably 
larger than differences in stimulus onset time (from nose-poke entry) variability (red) on 
trials in which there was no licking pre-stimulus. c) The concentrated energy scores taken 
from a 50ms window prior to the first lick on oscillation (blue) and non-oscillation (yellow) 
trials from all sessions and channels. d) Differences in lick variability between oscillatory 
and non-oscillatory trials for trials within a given range of times to stimulus onset (from 
nose-poke entry) from 0 to 2.5s in 100ms steps, collapsed across all sessions and channels. 
e) Differences in lick variability between oscillatory and non-oscillatory trials for trials 
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within a given range of inter-trial intervals from 0 to 10s in 100ms steps, collapsed across 
all sessions and channels. f) Differences in lick variability between oscillatory and non-




2.4 Results: Timed reward-seeking action tracks oscillation 
duration on a per-trial basis 
Given these differences in behavior with respect to the presence and spatial extent of cue-
evoked theta oscillations within V1, we next assessed whether the duration of these 
oscillations is directly related to the timing of the reward-seeking action (lick initiation). 
Figure 5a shows the first lick time per trial (pink squares) plotted over the concentrated 
energy values for an example session, sorted by oscillation duration.  Indeed, lick initiation 
tends to follow the edge of the oscillations’ termination (black circles).  By transforming 
this data into a scatter plot (Figure 5b), it appears that there is a positive relationship 
between first lick time and oscillation duration.  Indeed, across all sessions from this 
electrode, the distribution of regression slopes is significantly right-shifted (Figure 5c, 
histogram; p=3.29e-05, W69=1902, z=4.15, two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test against 
median=0), meaning that there tends to be a positive linear relationship between first lick 
time and oscillation duration.  This relationship holds across all sessions and channels 
(Figure 5d, blue line; p=3.43e-25, W414=65641, z=10.28), and is more pronounced in well-
trained compared to naïve animals (Figure 5d, blue vs red line; p=3.72e-10, U=196120, 
z=6.27, n1=414, n2=486; , two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test).  The same is also true when 
collapsing across channels per session (Figure 6a, top), and using a variety of other metrics 
and filters (Figure 6a, middle and bottom; Figure 6b).  Moreover, the mean slope across 
sessions is significantly higher (p<<.05) than the distribution of mean slopes for shuffled 
lick time data (Figure 5e; black dotted line is actual mean slope).  Finally, as described 
previously (49), the amplitude of the visually evoked potential (VEP)—the acute response 
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to the visual stimulus—is also related to the duration of the oscillation, but it is a 
considerably worse predictor of lick time than oscillation duration (Figure 6c, bottom). 
Given these observations, we investigated whether the strength of the oscillation influences 
the relationship between first lick time and oscillation duration.  Since the oscillation would 
likely exert less influence over behavior the weaker it is, we hypothesize that the 
relationship between first lick time and oscillation duration would degrade with oscillation 
strength (as appears to be the case in Figure 5a).  Indeed, filtering by trials with the 
strongest oscillations (that is, taking the x percent strongest oscillations, as defined by the 
mean concentrated energy in a 200-700ms window post-stimulus, in a given session) yields 
the strongest correlations (Figure 5f).  Coupled with the observations above, this indicates 
that the duration of cue-evoked oscillations relates to the timing of reward-seeking actions. 
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Figure 5 Lick time correlates with oscillation duration in trained animals 
a) Concentrated energy values with first lick times overlaid (pink squares) on trials sorted 
by oscillation duration. b) Scatter plot showing the relationship between oscillation 
duration and first lick time for the trials in a with a regression line shown in orange. c) The 
distribution of the slopes of regression for each session recorded on a given channel. d) 
The empirical cumulative distribution of the slopes of regression for all sessions and 
channels from naïve (red) and trained (blue) animals. e) The null distribution of slopes for 
the sessions taken from the trained cohort, calculated by randomly shuffling the 
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relationship between the lick time and oscillation duration 1000 times.  The actual mean 
slope across session is shown by the black dotted line. f) The slope of regression decreases 
as the percentage of trials with the strongest oscillations is systematically increased.  To do 
this systematic sweep, we sorted trials recorded on a given session/electrode by their mean 
concentrated energy and took the top x percent of trials. Therefore, the x-axis ranges from 
5% (in which only the trials in the top 5% of oscillation strength are included) to 100% (in 






Figure 6 Lick time correlates with oscillation duration across a wide range of metrics and 
parameters 
a) Slopes of regression for trained animals (blue) are right-shifted compared to naïve 
animals (red) when combining across channels per session (top) and using unrewarded 
trials only (middle). This trend can also be observed for the correlation coefficient (bottom) 
across all sessions and channels. b) Mean slope of regression across all sessions and 
channels for a variety of upper lick time and oscillation duration limits. c) (top) Local field 
potential trace from a single trial with a 250ms gray bar overlaid to highlight the visually 
evoked potential [VEP]. (bottom) The percent of variance explained by a regression of lick 
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time against oscillation duration (brown) or VEP amplitude (green) relative to a model 




2.5 Results: Cue-evoked single unit oscillations are predictive 
of timing performance 
Having observed this timing-related activity at the level of the local field potential, we 
sought to investigate the response patterns of single neurons recorded during this task.  An 
example response is shown in Figure 7a.  The spike raster (top) and peristimulus time 
histogram (bottom) across the whole session (i.e. all trials with a stimulus) suggest that this 
neuron primarily responds acutely to the visual stimulus (presented at time zero).  
However, separating each trial by whether an oscillation was detected in the local field 
potential (for a given electrode within the same hemisphere) reveals that there are, in fact, 
quite different response patterns during oscillation and non-oscillation trials (Figure 7b and 
c).  In particular, there is a long-duration oscillatory firing pattern on the oscillation trials, 
whereas there is predominantly an acute stimulus response on non-oscillation trials.  
Indeed, many neurons (~66%) show a significant difference in their responses on 
oscillation and non-oscillation trials (Figure 8a; methods).  This difference is quantified as 
the Autocorrelation Difference Index (ADI; methods), for which positive scores indicate 
more oscillatory spiking activity on LFP-identified oscillation trials.  The ADI for this 
example neuron is ~1.46, and the distribution of ADI’s across all neurons is positively-
shifted (Figure 9b, histogram; p =5.27e-34, W263=32152, z=12.16, two-tailed Wilcoxon 
signed rank test against median=0).   
Given this rhythmic discharge pattern, we characterized how oscillatory single unit activity 
was synchronized with the local field potential signal.  To assess this, we converted the 
local field potential voltage into a phase angle at every point in time and asked how well 
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the spikes aligned to a particular phase of the signal (methods).  For this example, the spikes 
(white squares) appear to be concentrated before the peak of the oscillatory envelope 
(Figure 9b, left; Figure 8c; p=1.50e-88, z=182.33, Rayleigh’s test for non-uniformity).  
Indeed, the spikes from most neurons across the population cluster around this phase 
(Figure 9b, right), indicating that these single units tend to be part of ensembles of neurons 
which are locked with one another.   
Given that the LFP oscillations are related to timing behavior and single unit activity is 
related to the LFP signal, we next assessed whether, and in what way, single unit oscillatory 
activity could be related to timing behavior. We addressed this issue by restricting our 
analysis to the spiking activity for each recorded neuron, setting the LFP data aside.  For 
each neuron, we categorized each trial from its recorded session as oscillatory or non-
oscillatory on the basis of its spike train (Methods), and then quantified the difference in 
first lick variance between these categories.  As with categorizing trials on the basis of 
oscillations detected in the LFP, we found that sessions tended to have higher lick variance 
on non-oscillatory trials, which in this case corresponds to leftward-shifted scores (Figure 
9d, blue line; p=6.49e-05, W257=11812, z=-3.99).  Further, given that neurons tended to be 
phase-locked to a particular phase of the LFP theta oscillation, we assessed whether 
aggregating evidence from multiple spike trains recorded simultaneously might boost the 
signal, improve classification, and consequently accentuate these behavioral differences.  
Indeed, by categorizing a trial based on the activity of multiple units, we found an even 
greater average difference in lick variance on oscillation and non-oscillation trials (Figure 
9c, red line; p=4.06e-05, W63=416, z=-4.05).  In addition, the performance of timed reward-
seeking behavior on oscillating trials improves with the size of the ensemble, as indexed 
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by an increase in the difference of lick variance between oscillation and non-oscillation 




Figure 7 Neural oscillations occur during LFP oscillations 
a) Spike rasters (top) for an example neuron on all trials, b) oscillation trials, and c) non-





Figure 8 Neurons spike at a consistent phase of the oscillations in the local field potential.  
a) P-values for the null hypothesis that there is no difference in spike distributions between 
trials with and without an oscillation in the local field potential for each neuron.  The dotted 
red line indicates where p=.05. b) The Autocorrelation Difference Index (which is a 
measure of the difference in the level of autocorrelation between spike-separated 
oscillation and non-oscillation trials) is considerably higher in neurons for which the null 
hypothesis stated in a is rejected (blue) than in those for which it is not (red). c) Heat maps 
showing the filtered local field potential (top) and phase angle (bottom) on LFP oscillation 





Figure 9 Timed lick behavior tracks single unit spike coherence  
a) The distribution of the Autocorrelation Difference Index across all neurons is right-
shifted, indicating that the spike train autocorrelation is higher on LFP oscillation trials. b) 
Polar plots indicating the distribution of LFP oscillation phase angles at which spikes occur 
for the example neuron (left) and the mean phase angle for each neuron in the population 
(right). c)  Empirical cumulative distribution functions for the difference in lick variance 
on spike-separated oscillation and non-oscillation trials (var[osc]-var[non-osc]) for 
individual neurons (blue) and neural ensembles (red). d) Relationship between neural 
ensemble size and difference in lick variance on each session (gray dots), with a regression 
line (dotted black line), and session means per ensemble size (pink dots).  
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2.6 Results: The likelihood of evoking an oscillation covaries 
with the recently experienced reward rate 
Since timing is more precise and accurate during oscillatory states in V1, we wondered 
what behavioral variable(s) might influence the likelihood of observing an oscillation on a 
given trial.  To assess this, we created a logistic regression model with several candidate 
explanatory variables, in which the dependent variable was the fraction of channels 
detecting an oscillation (out of six).  Of the variables tested, the inter-trial interval (that is, 
the time from nosepoke exit to subsequent trial initiation) was consistently the most 
informative (i.e. the distribution of its t-statistic across sessions was shifted farthest from 
zero) (Figure 10a).  Because the regression statistics can be influenced by extreme values, 
we probed this relationship further by plotting the likelihood of oscillation with respect to 
inter-trial interval alone (Figure 10b).  It can be seen from this plot that longer inter-trial 
intervals decrease the probability of evoking an oscillation.  Such a relationship may arise 
if the cortical state was tracking some behavioral rate, such as the trial rate, photic rate (i.e. 
the rate of visual stimulation), or reward rate recently experienced until that moment by the 
animal.  Therefore, we sought to dissociate these possibilities.  Specifically, we compared 
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) values—a measure of the discriminability 
between two distributions, in this case the rates on oscillation vs non-oscillation trials—
across all sessions.  For the filter parameter (which sets the integration dynamics for 
calculating the behavioral rates) associated with the maximal mean ROC (methods), all 
three variables are good predictors of oscillation likelihood, but the reward rate is the best 
predictor of the three (Figure 10c).  In fact, the reward rate was consistently the best 
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predictor over the full range of time windows analyzed (that is, the windows over the rates 
were calculated) (Figure 10d).  This suggests that oscillations are most prevalent during 
periods of high experienced reward rate in this behavioral timing task. 
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Figure 10 Reward rate is related to oscillation likelihood 
a)  Distributions of t-statistics across sessions for several variables in a logistic regression 
model in which the dependent variable is the fraction of electrodes displaying an oscillation 
on a given trial (out of six).  Of the variables considered here, the distribution of t-statistics 
for the inter-trial interval (red line)—the time between exit on the previous trial to 
subsequent trial initiation—is the farthest shifted from zero.  b)  Relationship between the 
probability of oscillation and the inter-trial interval (exit to poke time).  Probabilities are 
calculated by taking the number of oscillations divided by the total number of observations 
(i.e. all analyzed channels and trials) falling within a range of inter-trial intervals 500ms 
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wide, sweeping from .5s to 30s.  c)  Empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) 
for the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) values, across sessions, associated with the 
difference in various behavioral rates (reward, trial, and photic) between oscillation and 
non-oscillation trials.  These CDFs correspond to the exponential filter (used to calculate 
the rates) yielding the maximal mean ROC (methods).  d)  The mean ROC values for each 
rate variable across sessions, for each exponential filter size tested.  Daggers denote where 
the mean ROC value associated with reward rate is significantly different from that 
associated with trial rate.  
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2.7 Materials and Methods 
2.7.1 Behavioral task and neural recordings 
Experimental procedures were as previously described (36).  Briefly, water-deprived, 
adult, male, wild-type, Long-Evans rats were trained to perform a visually-cued timing 
task, in which they entered a nosepoke, waited a random delay without licking, received a 
100 ms full-field, monocular visual stimulus, executed a lick, and obtained a water reward 
(on 5/6 visually-cued trials).  The amount of reward available upon licking post-stimulus 
increased linearly up to 1.5 seconds, after which no reward was available (Figure 1a).  After 
animals were sufficiently trained (average wait times exceeded one second for three 
consecutive days), they were stereotaxically implanted bilaterally with 2x8 electrode arrays 
targeted toward layer IV of the binocular zone of primary visual cortex (V1). Following 
recovery and water deprivation, animals performed the task while neural recordings were 
collected, amplified, and filtered by Neurlanyx (Bozeman, MT) hardware.  For a different 
cohort of animals, referred to here as naïve, implantation occurred prior to training (and 
the ramp of available reward extended only to 1, instead of 1.5, seconds).  All procedures 
were conducted in accordance with the NIH Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory 
Animals and were approved by The Johns Hopkins University Institutional Animal Care 
and Use Committee.  Six spatially-distant electrodes (3 per hemisphere) were selected for 
local field potential analysis, to reduce redundancy in the signals.  
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2.7.2 Local field potential processing 
Neural signals were continuously sampled at 32kHz, downsampled to 2.2kHz, and 
bandpass filtered (1-400Hz). This filtered LFP signal was then converted to concentrated 
energy scores by applying the methodology in (49).  Here, concentrated energy is defined 
as the mean energy divided by the purity.  To calculate the mean energy, we first generate 
a time-frequency representation from the filtered LFP by applying Gabor filters with 
frequencies from 4 to 9 Hz in .5 Hz steps (standard deviation of Gaussian kernel=.5). The 
mean of this time-frequency representation across all frequency values for each point in 
time is defined as the mean energy.  Purity, a measure of how concentrated the energy 
was across the range of frequencies assessed, was calculated as:  
𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  Σ𝑓2 ∗ 𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 − (𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚)
2 
where f is the frequency values and 𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 is the energy at each frequency at every point in 
time normalized to the total energy at that time.    
2.7.3 Oscillation detection and duration 
The concentrated energy scores during a session were used to detect the presence of an 
oscillation and  duration, as described previously (49).  To categorize trials into oscillatory 
and non-oscillatory groups, we first created a threshold according to the formula:  
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 = (𝐶𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐶𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑛)/𝑐 
where 𝐶𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝐶𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑛are the maximum and minimum mean concentrated energy scores 
(taken from a 200-700ms window following a visual stimulus) for any visually-cued trial 
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across the session, respectively, and c is a constant equal to 2.5.  An oscillation trial is then 
defined as any trial where the concentrated energy value crosses this threshold at any point 
in the 200-700ms post-stimulus window.  For trials with an oscillation, the duration of the 
oscillation was the amount of time between when the concentrated energy exceeded this 
threshold to when it subsequently fell below the threshold. 
2.7.4 Oscillation states 
In order to establish whether it is appropriate to treat trials as belonging to one of two 
classes (oscillatory or non-oscillatory), we modeled the post-stimulus responses across 
trials.  To do this, we took the mean concentrated energy from a 200-700ms window post-
stimulus on each trial and attempted to find a good fit to this distribution.  We started with 
the most straightforward hypothesis that the concentrated energy values across trials arose 
from a Gaussian process, 𝒩(𝜇, 𝜎), which would result in a unimodal distribution.  This 
was tested against a mixed model in which two Gaussian processes are linearly 
combined, 𝑝 ∗ 𝒩(𝜇1, 𝜎1) + (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝒩(𝜇2, 𝜎2), which would result in a bimodal 
distribution. To compare these “1-gaussian” and “2-gaussian” models, we calculated the 
Akaike information criterion (AICc) values for each.  The AIC takes into account the 
likelihood (derived from maximum likelihood estimation) and also the model complexity, 
such that models with more parameters are penalized. In this case, the 2-gaussian model 
has 5 parameters whereas the 1-gaussian model has only 2 parameters.  AICc is a correction 
for small samples and is calculated as 𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑐 = 𝐴𝐼𝐶 + 2𝑘(𝑘 + 1)/(𝑛 − 𝑘 − 1).  The 
difference in AICc values (or, more specifically, exp((𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑐1 − 𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑐2)/2)) provides a 
measure, then, of the relative likelihoods of the models.   
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Because a unimodal Gaussian model is a simplistic alternative, we also tested against a 
variety of more plausible models.  Specifically, we tried to find the best alternative to the 
2-gaussian model among 17 continuous distributions implemented in a custom MATLAB 
script by Mike Sheppard (2012) [Fit all valid parametric probability distributions to data, 
MATLAB Central File Exchange, Retrieved November 17, 2015] which includes, among 
others, the following distributions: Beta, Exponential, Gamma, Generalized extreme value, 
Inverse Gaussian, Logistic, Log-logistic, Lognormal, Normal, Rayleigh, and Weibull.  Of 
these, ten provided reasonable fits to the data in less than 30% of cases and, thus, were 
excluded from the data.  Of the remaining seven candidates (which provided reasonable 
fits in 100% of cases), the Generalized extreme value distribution had the lowest overall 
AICc value across sessions and, therefore, was chosen as the best alternative to the 2-
gaussian model.  Unlike the unimodal Gaussian model, this model has skew and, thus, can 
fit the distribution of concentrated energies across trials better.  
2.7.5 Visually-evoked potential correlation 
The acute response to the visual stimulus, termed the visually-evoked potential (VEP), is 
defined here as the voltage modulation in the local field potential during the first 200ms 
post-stimulus.  To assess whether the correlation between the timed lick and oscillation can 
be explained by an earlier physiological event, we assessed whether the magnitude of the 
visually evoked potential (that is, the absolute difference between the peak and the trough 
in the voltage trace during this 200ms period) might be predictive of lick time.  Specifically, 
we calculated the percent of variance explained by a single variable (either oscillation 
duration or VEP amplitude) compared to a linear regression with both variables, across all 
sessions and channels. 
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2.7.6 Spike-LFP phase locking 
Spiking data was manually sorted using Offline Sorter software from Plexon (Dallas, 
TX).  Finding the phase of the oscillation at which these spikes occurred required 
converting the filtered LFP signal into a phase position at each time point.  This was 
achieved, as previously described (49, 97, 98), by decomposing the signal with a discrete, 
Meyer-type wavelet transform into its 3.9 to 7.9Hz components, applying a Hilbert 
transform on the reconstituted signal, and computing the angle of this result, z, with the 
following equation: 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒(𝑧) = 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔(log(𝑧)).  Rayleigh’s test for circular uniform 
distributions was then used to determine whether the phase angles at which the spikes 
occurred was isotropic.      
2.7.7 Spike train analysis 
In order to compare the degree of rhythmic activity on oscillatory and non-oscillatory trials, 
we created the Autocorrelation Difference Index (ADI).  The ADI is the difference in the 
autocorrelation scores on oscillation and non-oscillation trials, which are defined as the 
sum of the sample autocorrelation function from 100 to 300ms (which encompasses the 
range of the oscillatory periods) derived from the peristimulus time histogram (PSTH).   
To separate trials based on their spike trains alone, we assessed whether the autocorrelation 
score defined above increased or decreased as each trial was removed from a session’s 
overall PSTH.  If removing a trial decreased the overall autocorrelation, it was considered 
an oscillatory trial and vice versa.  For the ensemble analysis, each neuron in the ensemble 
(that is, the group of neurons recorded simultaneously during a session) was given a vote 
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based on the aforementioned criterion, and the majority vote determined whether a 
particular trial was labeled as oscillatory. 
2.7.8 Oscillation prevalence modeling  
To dissociate the contributions 
 of various behavioral rates (reward, trial, and photic) to the likelihood of evoking an 
oscillation, we systematically swept through a parameter space of integration filters that 
incorporated past behavioral statistics.  For completeness, we used both a uniform and 
exponential distribution as filters.  The distribution of means tested for each filter type were 
identical, and were 2𝑥 seconds, where x took on all integer values from 0 to 11, inclusive.  
The differentiability between the rates computed for all these parameters on oscillation and 
non-oscillation trials was measured on each session using the receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC).  The mean ROC for a particular filter, mean parameter, and rate type 
was the average ROC value computed in this way across sessions and channels.  We define 
the maximal mean ROC as the highest mean ROC for a given filter type (across all mean 
parameters and rate types). 
2.7.9 Assessing the acute effect of licking  
We examined the possibility that the lick itself could affect an ongoing oscillation, thereby 
artificially creating a distinction between oscillatory and non-oscillatory states.  Three 
analysis were brought to bear on this question.  First, we asked whether licking acutely 
suppresses an oscillation.  To address this, we calculated the average difference in 
concentrated energy between a 50ms window before and after a lick and compared it to the 
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null distribution of concentrated energy differences obtained by repeatedly (n = 1000) 
shuffling the relationship between the lick times and trial number.  Second, we investigated 
whether there was a phase relationship between licking and oscillations, in a manner 
similar to that described above in Spike-LFP Phase Locking, but for licks.  Third, we 
asked whether there was a discernable difference in oscillatory power even prior to licking.  
To address this, we calculated the distribution of concentrated energy scores in 50ms 
windows prior to the first lick on a given trial for oscillation and non-oscillation trials 




Appropriately timing actions in response to sensory stimuli is a necessary ability for 
survival.  Here, we show that oscillatory states in primary visual cortex may contribute to 
this ability.  Specifically, we show that there is an enhancement of precision and accuracy 
of timed reward-seeking responses following a visual cue, when that cue evokes theta 
oscillations in V1.  The more widespread across V1 this theta oscillation is, the greater the 
improvement in timing performance.  An appealing hypothesis to explain the difference in 
timed lick behavior between oscillatory and non-oscillatory states is that an ongoing 
oscillation in V1 exerts an influence on the animal’s decision to lick (perhaps via a 
downstream motor region) by suppressing licking throughout its duration.  Under this 
hypothesis, we would expect the time of the first lick to covary with the duration of the 
oscillation.  Indeed, this relationship was stronger for well-trained compared to naïve 
animals, suggesting that the association between the oscillatory state and the timed 
behavior is learned.  Furthermore, we found strong evidence for this oscillatory state in the 
spiking data of simultaneously recorded neurons.  These oscillatory firing signals are 
related to enhanced timing precision and, in addition, act in concert as ensembles to boost 
the predictive signal.  Together, these data suggest that there is a distinct oscillatory state 
in primary visual cortex that is related to the performance of visually-timed actions. 
An alternative to this interpretation is that lick initiation itself shuts down ongoing 
oscillations.  If this were the case, non-oscillation trials would appear to have earlier (and 
perhaps more variable) lick times, as a lick during the scoring window would increase the 
likelihood of being categorized as a non-oscillation trial. This explanation is not 
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satisfactory for a number of reasons, however.  First, a prior study (49) in which animals 
could and did lick freely post-stimulus (and before the typical delay to reward) did not 
detect a supression in ongiong oscillatory power.  In line with this observation, we find that 
the first lick following a visual stimulus does not acutely suppress an ongoing oscillation 
(p=.90, by random shuffling; methods). Second, as shown previously (49), we did not find 
any phase relationship between licking and oscillations, suggesting that the oscillation was 
not being driven by motor output (p>.05, Rayleigh’s test for non-uniformity; methods).  
Third, we found that the distribution of oscillation strengths is already much lower for non-
oscillation than oscillation trials prior to a lick (Figure 4c; p<.001, U=2.89e09, z=-261.86, 
n1=59466, n2=143514, two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test; methods) which suggests that 
these differences exist before the action.  In sum, these observations suggest that the timing 
activity in V1 is not merely a consequence of the behavioral action itself.  
Our findings thus further our understanding of V1’s role in stimulus-driven behaviors.  
Traditionally, V1 was thought to contribute only to the first stage of such behaviors: 
sensation.  Along these lines, primary visual cortex has been regarded as a feature detector 
which relays faithful representations of the visual world to downstream regions.  This view 
has been challenged by recent work suggesting that V1 can actively generate predictions 
about visual input (99–103) and can be influenced by behavioral variables such as 
attentional states (104–108) and reinforcement (109–111) (e.g. water reward).  Whereas 
these findings pertain to influences on perception, our findings provide evidence that V1 
makes predictions about non-visual outcomes.  Specifically, we find that following the 
acute visual response, V1 exhibits long-lasting theta oscillations that subtend the interval 
between stimulus and action during a timing task.  Thus, these oscillations in primary visual 
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cortex are a signature of V1’s involvement beyond perception and into the decision-making 
phase of a timed, stimulus-driven behavior. 
These observations also extend our knowledge about the role and behavioral significance 
of theta oscillations.  In the hippocampus, theta oscillations have been implicated in several 
cognitive functions, including voluntary movement, learning, and memory processes 
(112).  This rhythm is believed to contribute to these processes partly through facilitation 
of information transfer with prefrontal cortex (113, 114).  Indeed, oscillatory synchrony is 
a common mechanism for inter-regional communication which has been shown in a 
number of circuits (115), including those involving visual cortex (116–119).  In our 
visuomotor task, this mechanism may allow the output from primary visual cortex to be 
effectively read out by a motor region that ultimately initiates the action.  Within visual 
cortex itself, oscillations are often studied from a perceptual perspective and have been 
found to enhance responding to particular stimuli (120–122) and enable feature binding 
(46, 47).  Recent work has found, however, that oscillatory states in primary visual cortex 
may also be related to expectancy of future outcomes (48, 49).  We extend these findings 
by showing that theta oscillations in V1 are related to the precision and accuracy of 
visually-timed actions.  Though theoretical accounts of timing often implicate oscillatory 
processes in such timed behaviors (7), evidence supporting these theories has been lacking 
(61).   Finding this kind of signal as the earliest stage of cortical visual processing is 
particularly surprising and may suggest that such a mechanism is a common feature of local 
circuits.  
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These findings also raise the question of why there are multiple (i.e. oscillatory and non-
oscillatory) states in V1.  One straightforward possibility is that maintenance of an 
oscillatory response pattern is energetically taxing and, therefore, must be limited.  
Another, compatible possibility—given the relationship between reward rate and 
oscillation prevalence (Figure 10)—is that animals performing the timing task are seeking 
to balance knowledge accumulation with reward accumulation (i.e. the exploration vs 
exploitation trade-off) (123).  Under this construction, it may be advantageous for an agent 
to exploit its knowledge of the environment by tracking a theta oscillation and waiting a 
precise amount of time when the reward rate is high, but explore the environment 
otherwise.  In support of this hypothesis, a prior study found that experimentally increasing 
the reward rate increased the likelihood of evoking an oscillation (49).  Future studies that 
precisely manipulate reward rate during a behavioral timing task will help elucidate the 
role this factor plays in governing cortical state and temporal decision-making.   
A potentially rich avenue of future exploration would be to investigate what downstream 
regions are receiving and processing this information from V1.  One plausible candidate is 
motor cortex, which might directly use the signals emanating from V1 to exert control over 
the action (in this case, licking or suppression of licking).  In this simple circuit, the 
oscillatory signal might facilitate information transfer between these regions, as has been 
shown for similar circuits (115, 118, 124), even those involving primary visual cortex (116, 
117), or might simply provide a much clearer and robust signal for motor cortex to 
interpret.  In a similar vein, this oscillatory signal might be processed in the basal ganglia, 
a subcortical region crucial for voluntary movement, which is active even prior to self-
initiated actions (91).  A popular theoretical model for this type of interaction is the striatal 
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beat-frequency model, in which medium spiny neurons of the striatum detect an activity 
pattern across cortical oscillators in order to demarcate a temporal interval.    It is also 
possible that areas comprising the reward system receive this output from V1.  An 
appealing candidate in this regard is the ventral tegmental area (VTA) in the midbrain, 
which must receive reward-expectancy information in order to generate the prediction 
errors that are crucial for reinforcement learning.  Given these possibilities, it would be 
informative to simultaneously record from these brain areas and V1 as animals perform 
this visually-cued timing task.  
Another central question is how this oscillatory expectation signal in V1 arises.  Along 
these lines, modelling work has suggested that reinforcement signals induce the synaptic 
changes underlying cortical reward timing (125) and experimental work has demonstrated 
that cholinergic innervation from the basal forebrain is both necessary (34) and sufficient 
(35) for generating such signals in V1.  Other neuromodulator systems, like the 
dopaminergic and serotonergic systems, may also play a role.  As the dopaminergic system 
has been implicated in tracking vigor and reward rate (126), it might also contribute to the 
association between oscillation prevalence and reward rate described here (Figure 10).  It 
might be interesting, therefore, to study how disrupting or inducing these systems impacts 
the oscillatory signals and the behavior on this visually-cued timing task.  It is also likely 
that inhibitory interneurons—which are often implicated as key players in generating 
cortical oscillatory rhythms (127)—contribute to the oscillatory expectation signal in V1.  
In this regard, selective manipulation of Parvalbumin, Somatostatin, and Vasoactive 
Intestinal Polypeptide-expressing inhibitory interneurons, which are abundant in cortex, 
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may provide further insight into the origins and functions of oscillatory states in primary 
visual cortex.   
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Chapter 3. Interval storage and memory bias 
effects 
Abstract 
A common method for studying interval storage is classification, in which a subject must 
indicate whether a given probe duration is nearer a previously learned short or long 
reference interval. This task is designed to reveal the probe duration that is equally likely 
to be labeled as short or long, known as the temporal bisection point. Studies have found 
that this bisection point is influenced by a variety of factors including the ratio of the target 
intervals, the spacing of the probe durations, the modalities of the stimuli, the attentional 
load, and the inter-trial duration. While several of these factors are thought to be mediated 
by memory effects, the prototypical classification task affords no opportunity to measure 
these memory effects directly. Here, we present a novel bisection task, termed the 
“Bisection by Classification and Production” (BiCaP) task, in which classification trials 
are interleaved with trials in which subjects must produce either the short or long referents 
or their midpoint. Using this method, we found a significant correlation between the means 
of the remembered referents and the bisection points for both classification and production 
trials. We then cross-validated the bisection points for production and classification trials 
by showing that they were not statistically differentiable. In addition to these population-
level effects, we found within subjects evidence for co-variation across a session between 
the production bisection points and the means of the remembered referents. Finally, by 
using two sets of referent durations, we showed that only memory bias-corrected measures 
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were consistent with a previously reported effect in which the ratio of the referents affects 
the location of the bisection point. These results argue that memory effects should be 




Organisms rely on a wide range of temporal information to guide their behavior (7). At one 
end of the spectrum, organisms require sub-second information to guide movement (128, 
129). At the other end, their circadian rhythms are entrained by temporal cycles that span 
days (130). In between these extremes, organisms must be able to evaluate the length of 
temporal intervals on the order of seconds to hours to guide their decision-making (4, 5, 
131, 132). Because of the importance of this type of temporal information, interval timing 
has been studied extensively in laboratory settings. 
A common method for studying interval timing in humans is a classification task (133, 
134). While the precise form of this task has been modified frequently, its essential 
component is that subjects are required to classify sample temporal intervals as short or 
long. Typically, this classification relies on the subject remembering previously learned 
short and long reference intervals (i.e. similarity method). The obtained data is the 
percentage that the subject chooses to label an interval “long” as a function of probe 
duration length. From this data, the bisection point, or probe duration at which a subject is 
equally likely to choose “short” or “long”, can be calculated. 
Several theories of timing and time perception make predictions about the location of the 
bisection point. One of the most influential theories of timing, scalar expectancy theory 
(57), posits that the bisection point lies at the geometric mean of the short and long 
reference intervals (134). Another timing theory, which assumes a difference rule for 
comparing a probe duration to the short and long referents, predicts that the bisection point 
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lies at the arithmetic mean of the referents (133). More contemporary theories have been 
brought to bear in an attempt to systematically explain the observed variations in the 
bisection point location from the harmonic mean to the arithmetic mean (Killeen et al., 
1997; Kopec and Brody, 2010) and rationalize such variations in terms of reward-rate 
maximization (71) and optimal temporal risk assessment (137, 138).  Given that these many 
theoretical accounts of timing make specific predictions about the location of the bisection 
point, obtaining accurate and meaningful measurements of the bisection point is crucial.  
Indeed, many factors have been shown to affect the location of the bisection point. These 
factors include the ratio of the target intervals (50, 139), the spacing of the probe durations 
(140, 141), the modalities of the stimuli (142–146), the attentional load (147–150), and the 
inter-trial duration (151, 152). Several of these factors are thought to affect memory and, 
thereby, the subjective representation of time. Increasing the cognitive load, for example, 
by requiring subjects to observe emotionally-charged faces can cause either an 
overestimation or underestimation of time on a temporal bisection task, depending on 
whether the stimulus is arousing (e.g. angry face) or attention-demanding (e.g. shameful 
face), respectively (149).  Analogously, requiring subjects to engage in tasks which demand 
working memory, like remembering a series of digits, will cause distortions in temporal 
production (147, 148). Similarly, varying inter-trial duration is believed to affect the degree 
of memory trace degradation and, thereby, whether a subject is more likely to label an 
interval “short” (choose-short effect) or “long” (choose-long effect) (151, 152). 
It is not surprising that these factors affect time perception given that memory is a key 
component of several interval timing models. In pacemaker accumulator models, the 
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number of pulses generated by a pacemaker during the reference interval is stored in 
memory and compared against the number of pulses generated by a probe duration (58). 
This comparison serves as a proxy for comparing the length of a probe duration to the 
referent. Thus, affecting the rate of the pacemaker during the referent/probe duration, or 
altering values stored in memory, can affect the subjective representation of time. 
Pharmacological manipulations showing a dissociation of the effects on memory from 
effects on perception have bolstered this view (60, 153). Another model of interval timing, 
the striatal beat-frequency model, also reserves a key role for memory (66, 154). In this 
model, striatal neurons compare ongoing cortical oscillatory patterns to prior patterns of 
activation that co-occurred with the expiration of an interval. Still other models have 
posited that the strength of a memory trace is itself an internal clock (64, 155) which 
naturally meshes with the notion that alterations in memory affect time perception. 
Given the importance of memory in temporal perception, several variants of the 
prototypical bisection task have been developed to study its role. One variant of the 
similarity method, in which subjects are explicitly taught to recognize the short and long 
reference intervals, is the partition method, in which subjects must infer the range of 
intervals and, concomitantly, what constitutes a short and long interval (139, 141, 156). 
Interestingly, the results from these experiments indicate that both methods yield similar 
outcomes, suggesting that subjects do not compare probe durations directly to referents. 
Instead, it is believed that subjects translate these referent durations into a mental 
representation threshold above which a probe duration is classified as long and below 
which a probe duration is classified as short, a process which may be integral in cross-
domain comparisons of quantities (157). Another variant of the prototypical task in which 
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referents are provided at the beginning of the session only (i.e. “no-referents” method), is 
the “fixed-referents” task, in which the same referents are displayed before each trial (158). 
By replaying the reference intervals before each trial, the contribution of memory to the 
decision process should be reduced.  Yet another variant, the “roving-referents” task (159, 
160) changes the referent intervals on a trial-by-trial basis, thereby reducing or eliminating 
the effect of memory.    
Entirely different methods have also been employed to study temporal perception. One of 
the most prevalently used methods is a reproduction task in which subjects observe a 
temporal interval on each trial and must reproduce it as accurately as possible (161, 162). 
In this way, the translation of real time into subjective time can be observed across a wide 
range of time points while minimizing the role of memory. Another method requires 
subjects to periodically produce taps at a frequency set by a guiding stimulus (163). In this 
method, the readout is the temporal error in tapping after the guide stimulus has been 
removed. Yet another production method asks subjects to wait for a time specified by a 
verbal cue (e.g. 4 seconds). While relevant to some applications, this method does not fully 
control for subjects’ prior experience and also may be confounded by the interaction 
between magnitude (e.g. numerosity) and temporal perception (164–166). Though 
informative, these experimental methods do not, by construction, reserve a large role for 
memory and are, therefore, not ideal for studying its effects. 
Our goal was to develop a method for directly assessing how memory affects the bisection 
point location in prototypical bisection tasks. To do this, we developed the “Bisection by 
Classification and Production” (BiCaP) task which interleaves trials in which subjects must 
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use their memory to produce the short or long reference intervals or their midpoint with 
trials in which they must classify probe durations as short or long. Both classification and 
production trials yield an estimate of the bisection point (the point at which the subject 
classifies the interval “long” 50% of the time and the produced midpoint interval, 
respectively). We anticipated that the bisection point generated from each method would 
not be differentiable. Further, we hypothesized that the biases in the memory of the 
referents, as measured on a fraction of production trials, would co-vary with the location 
of the bisection point for both classification and production trials. This is indeed what we 




3.2 Results: Performance on the BiCaP Task 
To assess the effects of memory on the bisection point, we developed the “Bisection by 
Classification and Production” (BiCaP) task (Figure 11a), which consists of classification 
(top) and production (bottom) trials. Using this design, we were able to compare the 
bisection point produced from classification trials with the midpoint from production trials 
and, simultaneously, assess what the subjects believe the reference intervals to be. We used 
two sets of reference intervals, 1/5 seconds and 2/4 seconds, for different cohorts. 
We analyzed data from subjects in the 1/5s group to generate descriptive statistics for 
classification and production trials. As expected, data on classification trials in this group 
showed a monotonically increasing relationship between the length of the probe duration 
and the proportion that the interval was classified “long” (Figure 11b, black dots with 
SEMs across subjects). After fitting a sigmoid function to the data (R2=0.99), we found 
that the interpolated point at which the subject was equally likely to classify a probe 
duration as short or long (i.e. the bisection point) was 2.859s. This point has an associated 
Weber ratio, which is a measure of the standard deviation around a point divided by its 
mean. For classification, the Weber ratio is the difference limen, defined as half the 
difference in interval lengths at the points where the subject responded long 75% and 25% 
of the time, divided by the bisection point. The Weber ratio of the classification bisection 
point for the 1/5 group was 0.212.  
Mean responses on production trials are shown in the same panel (Figure 11b, lines). The 
mean produced bisection point, shown in red, is 3.269s ± 0.066s (SEM). The mean 
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produced short and long interval, shown in black, is 0.948s ± 0.032 and 5.844s ± 0.128s, 
respectively. Whereas the mean produced short interval was only slightly shorter than 1 
second, the mean produced long interval was nearly a whole second above its true value of 
5 seconds. Therefore, while the arithmetic mean of the referent intervals is 3 seconds, the 
bias-corrected arithmetic mean (i.e. the AM of the produced short and long reference 
intervals), shown by a solid green line, was 3.396s ± 0.066s. 
Next, we assessed whether the scalar property (57), which states that the standard deviation 
in time estimation grows linearly with temporal magnitude, holds for 
individual subjects in the 1/5 group. To do this, we calculated the Weber-like fraction 
(167), or coefficient of variation (i.e. standard deviation/mean), for production across the 
range of times tested (i.e. short reference, midpoint, and long reference). The median values 
for the population of subjects are plotted with the error bars indicating the interquartile 
range (Figure 11b, middle). To test whether Weber’s law holds across the pool of subjects, 
we compared the coefficient of variation (CV) for the population across the three intervals 
(short reference, production bisection point and long reference). We found a significant 
difference in median (p = 0.012, χ2(29)=8.83, Kruskal Wallis test) for produced intervals 
with the 1s and 5s references. Thus, our data does not support Weber’s law in the 
production of these intervals. Such a decreasing trend for the CV has also been observed 
in humans previously, wherein shorter intervals have larger CVs than longer ones (168). 
These analyses were repeated for the data from the 2/4 group. As was the case for the 1/5 
group, the proportion of probe durations classified “long” monotonically increased with 
the length of the probe duration (Figure 11c, black dots). The classification bisection point 
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was 3.180s and the Weber fraction was 0.155. As before, averaged responses on production 
trials are shown in the same panel (Figure 11c, lines). The mean production bisection point 
was 3.347s ± 0.061s. The mean production time for the short and long interval was 2.347s 
± 0.054s and 4.767s ± 0.101s, respectively. Consequently, the bias-corrected arithmetic 
mean of the two referents is larger than 3 (3.557s ± 0.057s). Repeating the same analysis 
with the Weber fractions for produced intervals in the 2/4 group, we found no difference 
in median across the range of intervals (p=0.24, χ2(29)=2.82, Kruskal Wallis test), which 




Figure 11 Performance on the BiCaP Task  
a. Design of the BiCaP task which consists of two trial types—classification and 
production—pseudo-randomly interleaved. b. The proportion that a given probe duration 
is classified long (left panel, black dots with SEMs across subjects) for the population in 
the 1/5s referent group. Mean produced intervals for the short reference (black dotted line), 
long reference (black dotted line), and midpoint (red dotted line) are shown along with the 
SEM (gray bars). The bias-corrected arithmetic mean (AM) (i.e. the AM of the produced 
short and long referent intervals) is shown in green. Note that both the produced midpoint 
and the bias-corrected AM lie above the true AM of the 1/5s reference intervals (i.e. 3 
seconds). The mean coefficient of variation (CV) across subjects for each production 
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interval is shown with SEMs on the middle panel.  The empirical cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of production times for the short reference (blue), long reference (red), and 
midpoint (yellow) is shown on the right panel. c. The population data for the 2/4s group. 
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3.3 Results: The location of the bisection point covaries with 
memory biases 
Next, we sought to assess the degree to which memory biases may have affected the 
location of the bisection point on both classification and production trials. To this end, we 
examined the correlation between the bias-corrected mean and the bisection points across 
subjects for classification trials (p=0.022, R2=0.26) and production trials (p=1.9x10-7, 
R2=0.79) and found both to be significant (Figure 12a, top). (Separating by groups, we 
found: classification 1/5s: p=0.175, R2=0.22; production 1/5s: p=0.002, R2=0.70; 
classification 2/4s: p=0.098, R2=0.30, production 2/4s: p=3.14x10-5, R2=0.90). We 
examined the co-variation between classification and production bisection points (Figure 
12c) and also found no significant difference between these groups (p = 0.15, two-tailed 
Mann-Whitney U test, U18 = 356, z = -1.45). 
Whereas classification is a purely perceptual measure of the subjective estimate of time, 
production includes both a perceptual component and a motor component. If the movement 
time associated with the motor component is automatically compensated for by the brain, 
we could treat the movement time to be zero (as we have done above). If it is not, however, 
the movement time would be likely added to the end of the interval. Using a prior study in 
which the mean movement time of clicking a computer mouse was estimated to be 
approximately 175 ms (using EEG to detect the moment of movement initiation) (Houlihan 
et al., 1998) as a guide, we subtracted this number from the subjects’ responses on 
production times. As expected, this manipulation did not affect the degree of correlation 
between the bias-corrected mean and the bisection points (Figure 12b). It did, however, 
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make the difference between production and classification bisection points even weaker (p 
= 0.64, U18 = 392, z = -0.47) (Figure 12d). 
We next sought to determine whether there was evidence for memory bias within data 
from individual subjects. To do this, we divided each subject’s session into ten equal 
blocks and asked whether the average midpoint production in a given block correlated 
with the mean of the produced short and long referent in that block.  We found that for 
the 1s/5s group, data from eight out of ten subjects showed positive slopes of regression 
(Figure 13a, left).  We compared the average slope across subjects (Figure 13a, red star) 
to that of the null distribution of slopes calculated by bootstrapping (Methods) and found 
that it was significantly different (p < .001).  We repeated this analysis for the 2s/4s 
group.  We found that data from nine out of ten subjects in this group showed positive 
slopes (Figure 13b, left) and the average slope across subjects was, again, significantly 
higher than that expected by chance (Figure 13b, red star; p = .007).  Therefore, we found 
evidence from individual subjects that memory bias across the session in the production 




Figure 12 Memory bias in production and classification 
a. We found a statistically significant correlation between the bias-corrected AM and the 
classification bisection point (p=.022) assuming a movement time 0 ms (left panel). We 
also found a highly significant correlation (p=1.9x10-7) with the bias-corrected AM for the 
production bisection point (right panel).  b. These results do not change assuming a 
different movement time (i.e. 175 ms). Production bisection points were not statistically 
distinguishable from classification bisection points c. if movement time was assumed to be 
zero (p = 0.15, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test, U18 = 356, z = -1.45) or d. if movement 




Figure 13 Within-subject analysis of memory bias in production   
a. Slope of regression in the 1/5s referent group between the mean of the produced referents 
and the averaged midpoint production per block for each subject. Data from 8/10 subjects 
show positive slopes.  The sampling distribution of slopes was calculated by bootstrapping 
(right).  The average slope for the 1/5s groups (red star) was significantly higher than the 
null distribution (p < .001). b. This analysis was repeated for the 2/4s referent group.  Data 
from 9/10 subjects showed positive slopes and the average slope was significantly higher 
than that of the null distribution (p = .007).  
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3.4 Results: The bias-corrected bisection point exhibits the 
referent ratio effect 
Prior work has shown that the ratio of referent intervals can affect the location of the 
bisection point (50, 139). A meta-analysis of classification data (136) reported that the 
bisection point lies near the geometric mean (GM) for ratios of 2 or less and lies near the 
arithmetic mean (AM) for ratios of 4 or greater. Since our referent interval sets spanned 
this range, we are able to assess whether our data follows this trend. We first performed 
these calculations for the population without taking into account memory bias. Neither 
the production nor the classification bisection points exhibited the referent ratio effect: 
the production bisection points for both groups were significantly greater than the 
arithmetic mean (1/5s: p = 9.2x10-5, W199=6845, z=-3.91; 2/4s: p = 1.16x10
-6, 
W199=5995, z=-4.86, two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test against median=3) and the 
classification bisection points were higher for the 2/4 group (3.180s) than the 1/5 group 
(2.859s) and were found to be significantly different by bootstrapping (p<0.001).  
Given that the bisection points correlate with a bias-corrected measure, we sought to 
determine whether the referent ratio effect could be observed for the remembered referents 
instead. To this end, we created a distance index defined as: 
   
Thus, when D.I = 0, the bisection point equals the bias-corrected GM and when D.I=1, the 
bisection point equals the bias-corrected AM. Analyzing the data this way, we found 
evidence for the referent ratio effect in production trials (but not classification trials for 
bisection point  bias corrected GM
Distance index=




which the power was likely too low). Qualitatively, the mean of the distance index for the 
1/5s group was higher than that of the 2/4s group for both classification and production 
trials (Figure 14a), even when assuming a non-zero movement time (Figure 14b). 
Quantitatively, the production bisection point for the 1/5s group was significantly different 
from the GM (Two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test with n =10, p = 0.0091 U = 140, z = 2.608; 
n = 10, p = 0.0046, U = 143, z = 2.8347, for 0ms and 175ms movement times, respectively) 
but not the AM (p = 1, U = 105, z = 0, for both movement times).  While these comparisons 
were not significant for the 2/4s group, the production bisection points for the 1/5s and 2/4s 
groups were significantly different in closeness to the GM and AM (0.0376, U = 77, z = -




Figure 14 The effect of referent ratio on the bisection point location 
Previous work has demonstrated that the bisection point transitions toward the arithmetic 
mean (AM) from the geometric mean (GM) as the ratio of the referents increases (50, 136, 
139).  Here, we show the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the distance indexes 
(defined in Results) for classification and production bisection points. Qualitatively, the 
data obeys this trend as the median bisection point across all subjects is closer to the AM 
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for the 1/5s group (referent ratio of 5) than the 2/4s group (referent ratio of 2) for both 
classification (left) and production (right) trials assuming a. a movement time of 0 ms and 




3.5 Material and Methods 
3.5.1 Subjects 
20 healthy, human subjects aged 22-38 participated in this study. All subjects were 
recruited from The Johns Hopkins University were naïve about the purpose of the study 
and gave consent to participate. All procedures were approved by the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB).      
3.5.2 Apparatus  
Subjects were placed in a quiet room in front of a MacBook Pro. Instructions were 
displayed on the screen and simultaneously read aloud by the experimenter. All responses 
were registered by clicks on a wireless mouse. For production trials, the subjects had to 
left-click to start and stop the interval. For classification trials, the subjects had to left- or 
right-click to classify the interval as short or long, respectively. Clicks prior to the end of 
the interval were not registered. To proceed to a subsequent trial, the subject was required 
to tap the space bar once. The trial type was indicated at the top of the screen. Stimuli were 




Prior to testing, subjects experienced a training phase that consisted of three parts. In the 
first part, observation, subjects were instructed to observe short and long intervals. Each 
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interval was labeled as either “SHORT” or “LONG” at the top of the screen. 12 
observation trials were given. In the second part, classification training, subjects were 
shown an unlabeled short or long reference interval and instructed to classify. Depending 
on whether they classified it correctly or incorrectly, they were shown a smiley or frowny 
face for 1 second. In order to pass classification training, the subject had to correctly 
classify 3 short and 3 long intervals consecutively by type (with the trial types interleaved 
with one another). In the third part, production training, subjects were instructed to 
produce the short or long reference interval by instructions at the top of the screen. 
Depending on whether the response was close enough (i.e. within a window centered on 
the appropriate interval whose half-width was a Weber fraction of 0.2), they were shown 
a smiley or frowny face for 1 second. The value of the Weber fraction was chosen to be 
close to the fraction observed for well-trained subjects on classification and production 
tasks; a meta-analysis of classification data shows that the Weber fraction is around .2 for 
human subjects (136) and a similar production procedure to the one used here found a 
Weber fraction around .15 in well-trained humans who receive do not receive feedback 
and do not chronometrically count (169). 
 Additionally, subjects received feedback about how far from the appropriate interval they 
were off (in milliseconds, rounded to the nearest integer). This feedback would appear on 
the left or right side of the screen depending on whether the response was short or long, 
respectively. The text was in green font for correct responses and red for incorrect 
responses.  
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Production training itself was divided into three stages, in which the subject produced short 
referents only, long referents only, and then short and long referents inter-mixed. For 
training on the short trials only, the mean ±the standard deviation of the subject’s last 8 
responses needed to be between the lower (LBshort) and upper (UBshort) bound (in seconds). 
The same calculation was performed for the long trials except the range was LBlong and 
UBlong. During the final part, in which trials were inter-mixed, these criteria were applied 
to short and long trials separately. 
Subjects were placed into one of two groups. In one group, the 1v5 group, the subjects (10) 
were trained with a short referent that was 1 second in length and a long referent that was 
5 seconds in length. For production training in this group, LBshort = .6s, UBshort = 1.4s, 
LBlong = 3.75s, and UBlong = 6.25s. In other words, the mean ± the standard deviation on 
short production trials had to be between .6s and 1.4s over the last 8 responses, whereas 
the mean ± the standard deviation on long production trials had to be between 3.75s and 
6.25s. In the other group, the 2v4 group, subjects (10) were trained with a short referent 
that was 2 seconds and the long referent that was 4 seconds. For production training in this 
group, LBshort = 1.5s, UBshort = 2.5s, LBlong = 3s, and UBlong = 5s. The subjects were never 
explicitly told which group they were in nor what the length of the referent stimuli were.  
Experimental Testing 
After passing training, subjects were told they would be asked to "1. CLASSIFY the sample 
interval (based on whether it's closer to the short or long target interval) or 2. PRODUCE 
the short interval, long interval or MIDPOINT between them" during testing. All subjects 
performed a novel task called the “Bisection by Classification and Production” (BiCaP). 
 87 
This task combines a prototypical classification task (133, 134) with novel aspects. For the 
classification component, subjects were required to classify a probe duration as either short 
or long (by left- or right-clicking, respectively). The novel aspect of the task, the production 
component, required subjects to produce the short referent, the long referent, or the 
midpoint between them (by left-clicking to start and stop the interval). Note that while 
subjects produced the long and short referents during training, they were required to 
produce a third interval, the midpoint, during testing. Trial types were indicated at the top 
of the screen. For classification trials, the instruction was “CLASSIFY” whereas for the 
production trials the instruction was “PRODUCE SHORT”, “PRODUCE LONG”, or 
“PRODUCE MIDPOINT”. No feedback was provided during testing.  
Stimuli 
The stimuli were blue ovals (122 x 73 pixels) that appeared at the center of a white 
background (1220 x 730 pixels). The duration that the blue interval appeared on the screen 
constituted the length of the interval. On classification trials, the subject could left or right-
click after the stimulus had ended. On production trials, a blue oval would appear upon 
clicking to start the interval and would disappear upon clicking to end the interval.  
During training, only short and long referents were displayed. On each trial, the probability 
of receiving a short or long referent (or being asked to produce the short or long referent in 
the third stage of production training) was equal. During testing, many probe durations 
were displayed. For the 2v4 group, the probe durations used were {2.0, 2.33, 2.66, 3.0, 
3.33, 3.66, 4.0} and for the 1v5 group, the probe durations were {1.00, 1.67, 2.33, 3.00, 
3.67, 4.33, 5.00} (i.e. 7 linearly spaced intervals between the short and long referent, 
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inclusive). In all, 110 trials were performed by each subject during testing. A block 
structure was used in which each block consisted of 11 trials and there were ten blocks per 
session. A block consisted of 7 classification trials (one of each probe duration), 2 midpoint 
production trials, and 2 referent production trials (1 short and 1 long). Within a block, the 
presentation order was random. 
3.5.4 Analysis of classification 
To analyze classification data, we numerically fit a psychometric function for the 
probability that an interval t is labeled as closer to “long” by the generalized logistic 
function shown below 
   
where p1, p2, p3 and p4 represent free-fit parameters. Once the best fit parameters were 
obtained using non-linear regression, the bisection point (the duration for which 
p(“long”)=0.5) was calculated as 
   
The Weber fraction was measured the difference limen, which is defined as half the 
difference in the durations corresponding to p(“long”)=0.75 and p(“long”)=0.25, 
divided by the bisection point. This is shown below 









































The sensory Weber fraction was calculated as the ratio between the error and bisection 
point. 
In order to calculate the 95% confidence intervals, we used bootstrapping. This was 
performed for 1000 runs by randomly drawing different trials with replacement and 
calculating the resultant Weber fraction for each run. The 95% confidence intervals were 
measured from this sampling distribution.  
To test whether the slopes of covariation between the bias-corrected arithmetic mean (i.e. 
the mean of the produced short and long referent intervals) with respect to production 
bisection point and classification bisection point were significantly different, we used 
bootstrapping. For each bootstrap, we randomly selected subjects with replacement and 
calculated the difference in these slopes. This procedure was repeated 2,000 times to 
obtain a two-tailed p value for whether the sampling distribution of the difference in 
slopes was significant.  To look for within-subject evidence of memory bias in the 
production bisection point, we divided the data from each subject’s session into 10 equal 
blocks of 11 trials each (which was the experimentally imposed block length).  For each 
block we averaged the two midpoint productions and computed the mean of the short and 
long referent productions.  We then regressed the averaged midpoint against the mean of 
the referent productions per block and obtained the slope of regression for each subject.  
The mean of the slopes across subjects within the 1s/5s or 2s/4s cohort was compared to a 
null distribution of slopes from each cohort.  The null distribution was created by 
randomly shuffling the data within a subject’s session, computing the slope of regression 
for each subject, and taking the average of the slopes from each subject.  This procedure 
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was repeated 1,000 times to obtain a two-tailed p value for whether the average of the 





Considering the effect of memory bias on the bisection point location is critical as different 
theoretical accounts of timing make different predictions about where it lies (50). Theories 
that hypothesize a linear mapping between real time and subjectively represented time, and 
assume a difference rule in comparing a probe duration to each of the referents, predict that 
the bisection point lies at the arithmetic mean (133).  Scalar timing theory, which favors a 
ratio rule for comparing a probe duration to each referent, predicts that the bisection point 
lies instead at the geometric mean (134).  Still other theories, which perhaps best accord 
with the preponderance of the behavioral data, predict that the bisection point location will 
vary, based on task parameters and subjective statistics, all the way from the arithmetic 
mean down to the harmonic mean (71, 135, 136).  Given the importance of the bisection 
point location to these theories, it is critical to account for the sources of bias in measuring 
the bisection point.     
We sought to measure the memory bias in bisection point location by employing both 
temporal classification and production methods. While several studies have examined the 
similarities and differences between temporal classification and production (163, 170), the 
“Bisection by Classification and Production” (BiCaP) task we used is unique in that these 
methods are employed simultaneously (by interleaving different trial types within a single 
session). Using this method, we were able to directly address whether memory biases can 
affect the location of the bisection point.  Indeed, we found that the bias-corrected 
arithmetic mean, calculated from the mean produced time of the short and long referents, 
co-varied with the classification bisection point (Figure 12, column 1). We also found co-
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variation with the production bisection point (Figure 12, column 2). While we found 
significant co-variation between the bias-corrected arithmetic mean and the production 
bisection point within the 1/5s and 2/4s groups separately, we did not observe the same 
within each group for the classification bisection point.  Perhaps the bias-corrected 
arithmetic mean is not as predictive of the classification bisection point location as it is 
derived from production trials, and, consequently, higher power would be needed to reveal 
significance within these groups.  We also found evidence for within-subject co-variation 
between the production bisection point and the mean of the remembered referents across 
the session (Figure 13). Taken together, we show that considering memory bias of the 
referents helps account for the variability in the bisection point observed on both 
classification and production trials.  Such bias is difficult to directly measure in 
prototypical classification tasks in which only data about the bisection point (both its 
location and associated CV) is obtained.    
An alternative explanation of our findings is that the observed biases are attributable to 
clock speed changes. This interpretation is challenged by the fact that we do not observe 
biases in production of the one second reference duration whereas we do observe a large 
bias for production of the five second duration. It is possible, however, that this differential 
observation is due to the fact that different mechanisms may underlie sub- and supra-
second timing (171).  To further address this question, we looked at whether a clock speed 
interpretation could apply to the 2/4s group.  If clock speed is accounting for the observed 
effects, then we might expect to find a change in produced times of the reference durations 
from training to testing. Assuming the clock speed changes were linear, we should expect 
to see a proportional change for the short reference duration as the long reference duration 
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(which in this case, are 2 and 4 seconds, respectively).  To test this, we performed a two-
sided Wilcoxon signed rank test and found that the medians of the ratios for the 2s duration 
(that is, the ratio of the production duration during testing to the duration during training) 
were significantly different from those of the 4s duration (p = .0039). We repeated this for 
the 1/5s group and, not surprisingly, found that the medians were again significantly 
different (p = .0059). This suggests that our effects are not attributable to linear variations 
in clock speed. It is difficult, of course, to rule out the possibility that some arbitrary non-
linear clock speed variation may account for our effects, but a linear relationship in 
commonly assumed is pacemaker-accumulator models (60). 
Importantly, prior work has studied the effects of reference memory and found no effect 
on time perception (158, 172, 173). Allan and Gerhardt directly addressed this issue by 
comparing the prototypical bisection task to a “roving-referents” task (159, 160), in which 
new referents are shown prior to every trial and the subjects must determine whether a 
probe interval is more similar to the first or second referent. In this study, no difference 
was observed between the prototypical task and the roving referents version of the task. 
One explanation for this conflicting result is that this study was performed in the sub-
second range with intervals that spanned 400 to 750ms. As mentioned above, many 
empirical findings suggest that there is a perceptual dichotomy between sub- and supra-
second timing (171) and it has been shown that different brain regions are engaged in sub 
and supra-second timing tasks (174). Consequently, it is possible that memory biases are 
much smaller in the sub-second range where the interval storage may be more accurate. In 
addition, the ratios of the reference durations used in that study were all less than the ratios 
used here (five for the 1/5s group and two for the 2/4s group). Since errors in time 
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perception are known to grow with the duration of the intervals to be timed (Gibbon, 1977), 
we reason that errors in temporal memory may grow with the length of the intervals to be 
remembered and, consequently, memory biases in the bisection point may be larger for 
higher reference durations. Given our finding, it would be interesting in the future to 
administer the BiCaP task using reference durations in the sub-second range.  
In addition to directly addressing the contribution of memory bias to the measurement of 
the bisection point, the results from the BiCaP task also afforded the opportunity to look at 
whether production and classification rely on common timing mechanisms, a question 
which has been elegantly addressed in prior work (163, 170, 175–177). We were able to 
build on this body of work in several ways.  First, whereas most previous studies have 
relied on comparisons across different experimental blocks, the BiCaP task involves 
comparisons among trial types within a single session. This approach may, therefore, better 
control for state effects, thereby decreasing the likelihood that subjects rely on short-term 
muscle memory to guide performance in production trials.  It should be noted, however, 
that inter-mixing these trial types may affect the performance on each type.  As it is known, 
for instance, that the order of reference duration presentation can affect the bisection 
location (158), it is possible that the presence of a classification trial or a short reference 
production could affect, say, a midpoint production.  It would be informative, therefore, to 
see how these results vary when trial-type blocks are used. Second, several of these studies 
have used rhythmic tapping tasks, in which the subject must produce periodic and repetitive 
movements, as a basis for comparison to classification. We chose a different approach as 
the motor movements themselves in tapping tasks contribute a large source of variability 
in the responses (176, 178). Third, while most previous human studies have focused on the 
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sub-second range, we were interested in the seconds range of temporal perception. Using 
this method, we found that the bisection point derived from production and classification 
trials could not be distinguished (Figure 12, column 3). This lends support to the hypothesis 
that these distinct methods share at least partially overlapping timing mechanisms (163, 
170, 175).  
We sought to address not only whether production and perception relied on similar timing 
mechanisms, but also what the nature of these mechanisms might be. By using two sets of 
referent probes (1/5s and 2/4s) we were better able to address this question as the location 
of the bisection point derived from classification has been shown to vary with the ratio of 
the referents used (50, 139). A meta-analysis showed that the bisection point will tend to 
be nearer the arithmetic mean for referent ratios exceeding 4 and be nearer the geometric 
mean for ratios lower than 2 (136). Our reference sets spanned this range (ratio of 5 for the 
1/5s and ratio of 2 for 2/4s group) so we were able to investigate this question. Interestingly, 
the raw bisection points for classification and production clearly did not accord with this 
trend and, in fact, were not consistent with any known model (50).  The fact that our raw 
bisection points do not accord with that of Wearden and Ferrara (1996) and others may be 
due to the fact that they use interval durations that are approximately an order of magnitude 
smaller; as it is known that different timing mechanisms are engaged for sub- and supra-
second timing, (7) the memory bias may not be as large a factor in this temporal regime. 
However, when we looked at the location of the bisection points with respect to bias-
corrected measures of the arithmetic (Figure 14, green lines) and geometric (Figure 14, 
blue lines) means, we found significant evidence that the production bisection point 
followed this trend (though the classification data was likely underpowered to address this 
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question). It is important to note, however, that the presence of the one second reference 
duration, which may engage multiple timing mechanisms as mentioned above, may affect 
the comparison between the 1/5s and 2/4s groups. It is also important to note that, in 
addition to the reference duration ratio, the bisection point location can also be affected by 
the probe spacing and the presence of feedback.  Here, we chose a linear probe spacing 
which, compared to logarithmic spacing, has been shown to push the bisection point closer 
to the arithmetic mean in human subjects (136, 141). Therefore, it is possible that the 
bisection points in this study, which tended to be higher than the arithmetic mean, would 
have been pushed lower by a non-linear probe spacing.  In addition, it is likely that the 
presence of feedback (similar to that used in training) on some fraction of trials would have 
yielded more veridical timing. 
One aspect of our data violates a long-held tenet of time perception—scalar timing. 
Specifically, scalar expectancy theory predicts that as the standard deviation in temporal 
estimation grows with the temporal magnitude to be estimated (57). Although scalar timing 
is commonly cited as a fundamental feature of time perception, there are many examples 
in which it is violated (168, 179). Our data adds to these examples, as Weber’s law was 
violated for production trials in that the CVs of the production for the short, long, and 
midpoint intervals were significantly different in the 1/5s group. A potentially trivial 
explanation for this result is that the subjects were trained much more extensively on the 
referent intervals than on the midpoint intervals (which they were required to produce de 
novo, without any feedback, during testing). This does not explain why our results were 
consistent with Weber’s law in the 2/4s group, however.  Another explanation, alluded to 
above, is that the one second reference duration engages another timing mechanism from 
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that engaged by the reference durations in the supra-second range. Interestingly, we did 
find evidence that the CV is inversely related to the bisection point on production trials in 
the 1/5s group (slope = -8.53, p = .0042, R2 = .6627), as predicted by some theoretical 
accounts of timing (71, 137). This relationship was not significant for classification trials 
or for the 2/4s group. 
In sum, we have shown evidence that memory bias can account for variation in the location 
of the bisection point for both classification and production. In addition, by interleaving 
these trial types, we were able to simultaneously measure the classification and production 
bisection points and found that they were not significantly different, suggesting that these 
tasks rely on at least partially overlapping timing mechanisms. Using bias-corrected 
measures we were able to recapitulate some previously reported effects of the referent ratio 
on the bisection point, which non-corrected measures could not explain. These results 
suggest that it is important to consider memory bias in timing and design future 
experiments to measure its effects.  
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Chapter 4. Interval evaluation and spatial 
foraging patterns 
Abstract 
Understanding the exploration patterns of foragers in the wild provides fundamental insight 
into animal behavior. Recent experimental evidence has demonstrated that path lengths 
(distances between consecutive turns) taken by foragers are well fit by a power-law 
distribution. Numerous theoretical contributions have posited that “Lévy random walks”—
which can produce power-law path length distributions—are optimal for memoryless 
agents searching a sparse reward landscape. It is unclear, however, whether such a strategy 
is efficient for cognitively complex agents, from wild animals to humans. Here, we 
developed a model to explain the emergence of apparent power-law path length 
distributions in animals that can learn about their environments. In our model, the agent’s 
goal during search is to build an internal model of the distribution of rewards in space that 
takes into account the cost of time to reach distant locations (i.e. temporally discounting 
rewards). For an agent with such a goal, we find that an optimal model of exploration in 
fact produces hyperbolic path lengths, which are well-approximated by power laws.  We 
then provide support for our model by showing that humans in a laboratory spatial 
exploration task search space systematically and modify their search patterns under a cost 
of time. In addition, we find that path length distributions in a large dataset obtained from 
free-ranging marine vertebrates are well described by our hyperbolic model. Thus, we 
provide a general theoretical framework for understanding spatial exploration patterns of 
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4.1 Introduction  
Understanding the movement patterns of wild animals is a fundamental question in ecology 
with implications for wildlife conservation. It has recently been hypothesized that random 
search patterns known as Lévy walks are optimal and underlie the observed power-law 
movement patterns of wild foragers. However, as Lévy walk models assume that foragers 
do not learn from experience, they may not apply generally to cognitive animals. Here, we 
present a novel decision-theoretic framework wherein animals attempting to optimally 
learn from their environments will show near-power law distributed path lengths due to 
temporal discounting (where the value of a reward diminishes with the delay in its receipt).  
We then provide experimental support for this framework in human exploration in a 
controlled laboratory setting and in animal foraging in the wild. 
Lévy walks are a special kind of random walk whose path lengths form a power law 
distribution at their asymptotic limit (x): min( )  ;  1 3;  p x x x x
      (180–183). 
Numerous recent papers have demonstrated that foraging animals in the wild or under 
controlled conditions show path lengths consistent with power laws (74, 184–189), which 
are proposed to arise from an underlying Lévy walk process. Theoretical models have 
demonstrated that such a process can be optimal for memoryless agents searching for 
randomly distributed rewards across space under certain conditions (76, 180, 181). 
Together, these findings have led to the Lévy flight foraging hypothesis which states that 
such search patterns have arisen due to their evolutionary advantage (181, 182) However, 
since many animals, including humans, are cognitively complex and can learn from their 
environments, it is important to address whether such heavy-tailed path lengths are optimal 
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even for cognitively complex agents (05). The question of how memory influences 
foraging patterns  has been approached in some contexts (190–193) but has not yet been 
sufficiently addressed (77, 194–196). 
Because power-law path lengths have been observed in sparse and dynamic environments 
(e.g. open ocean), in which foragers rarely revisited previously rewarded locations (187, 
188, 197, 198), it is reasonable to assume, as foundational models have, that there is little 
advantage to learning about the reward distributions at any given spatial location. Hence, 
under this assumption, prior studies constrained the class of models studied to random 
searches in the absence of learning. However, despite the fact that remembering spatial 
locations in environments such as open oceans may not be advantageous, it is widely 
believed that many ecological parameters, including prey distributions, show high degrees 
of spatial autocorrelation (199, 200).  Moreover, it has been found that these distributions 
can exist as hierarchies, wherein large, global spatial structures comprise smaller, more 
local structures, and, that predators potentially learn these mean scales in the spatial 
distribution of prey (199, 200). Therefore, given the existence of patterns in the distribution 
of prey in relative space, it may be advantageous for predators to build representations, or 
models, of these patterns as opposed to performing purely random searches (05a,b). In this 
paper, we show that in order to optimally learn the reward distribution across relative 
spatial scales in the service of future reward rate maximization, foragers would produce 




Figure 15 Optimal search of a bounded area containing reward by a forager with spatial 
memory 
A forager with spatial memory searches a bounded area containing uniformly distributed 
rewards. The optimal solution, assuming that the forager has a limited perceptual range, 
is to tessellate the search region into bins defined by the perceptual range so that every 
location in the search space can be sensed by single visits to the locations xmin+rp, 
xmin+3rp, xmin+5rp, … xmax. If the forager has no spatial memory and hence cannot 
remember which location it visited on the previous search bout, it will be suboptimal.  
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4.2 Results: Optimal foraging under temporal constraints  
How might foragers build a model of the relative spacing between food items? Consider 
the foraging behavior of albatrosses, for instance. A straightforward solution is to build a 
model of rewards obtained as a function of distance flown on each step (16c). Since the 
speed of movement during searching is often nearly constant for many foragers (e.g. 8, 16), 
this model can also be built with respect to the time flown on each step. The question faced 
by the forager then becomes how to sample different step lengths so as to maximize the 
ability to detect differences in reward distributions associated with each step length.  
However, foragers do not treat the same reward available at different delays equally: the 
later the receipt of a reward, the less its subjective value (202, 203). In other words, the 
subjective value of a reward expected after a long flight is smaller than that of the same 
reward obtained immediately. Many behavioral experiments have shown that the cost of 
time associated with a delayed reward takes a specific functional form: that of a hyperbolic 
(for µ=1) or hyperbolic-like (for µ1) function (202–209), shown below, 
(1) 
where SV(r,t) and D(r,t) represent the subjective value and discounting function, 
respectively, of a reward of magnitude r delayed by a time t. c and µ represent parameters 
that measure the rate at which the value of a delayed reward is discounted. In light of such 
a cost of time, exploration of a given flight time ought to be done under consideration of 
its utility for future exploitation. Thus, the foragers must explore so as to maximize their 
( , ) ( , )
(1 )
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ability to discriminate subjective value (not reward) distributions associated with different 
step lengths. 
Here, we show that in order to maximize the ability to discriminate the subjective value 
distributions associated with different step lengths, the forager has to sample each step 
length in proportion to the uncertainty in subjective value associated with that step length. 
This strategy makes intuitive sense since the higher the uncertainty associated with an 
option, the more it must be sampled to learn its properties. Such a strategy of exploring in 
proportion to uncertainty has previously been assumed to be an exploration heuristic (210). 
However, we show that it is in fact optimal for maximizing discriminability (Figure 16). 
For a forager that initiates exploration under a uniform prior (i.e. no a-priori assumption 
regarding the distribution of rewards), sampling in proportion to uncertainty in subjective 
value equates to sampling in proportion to the discounting function associated with a flight 
time. As previously mentioned, the discounting function over flight time is hyperbolic. 
Therefore, for constant speed, the discounting function for a path length is also hyperbolic. 
Thus, we predict that the path length distribution of a forager attempting to explore the 
reward distribution across relative space will be  
(2) 
This is similar in appearance to a power law, but differs due to the presence of an additive 
constant c.  Consequently, while it decays asymptotically as a power law, it predicts a 
constant probability at low values. Further, note that any distribution that is consistent with 











necessarily be consistent with the above distribution since the power law distribution is a 
special case of Equation 2 in which c=0. Since foragers might limit the range of their 
exploration to a bounded interval of step lengths (e.g. due to behavioral/environmental 
constraints), the above probability distribution would only be expected to hold in a 
truncated domain (between xmin and xmax) under exploration. Further, in reward dense 
environments, we propose that observed path lengths would reflect not just the intended 
path lengths shown in Equation 2, but also the truncation due to prey encounter, thus 




Figure 16 Model for adaptive benefits of apparent Lévy walks 
a. The environments of foragers often show spatial autocorrelation with a mean spatial 
scale. Thus, it is likely that foragers attempt to build a model of the mean spatial scale by 
building a model of rewards obtained for different flight distances (b & c) (see text). d. An 
optimal model of exploration that maximizes discriminability requires foragers to sample 
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different flight distances (or durations) in proportion to the uncertainty in subjective value 
of rewards predicted at those distances. If the prior expectation of rewards is uniform, the 
sampling of different flight distances will produce a hyperbolic-like distribution—due to 





Figure 17 Prey truncation leads to exponential path lengths when the density of food is 
high:  
Observed path lengths of foragers no longer reflect the intended path lengths when the 
distribution of prey is high due to prey-encounter truncation. The resultant path lengths can 
be shown to be exponential for a 2-D environment with randomly distributed prey. 
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4.3 Results: Human exploratory task  
The model described above makes several predictions about search behavior of a 
cognitively-complex agent that we could test with humans in a controlled laboratory 
setting. Specifically, we sought to determine 1) whether humans search space in a random 
search pattern as expected from the Lévy walk model, or, in a systematic and deterministic 
way, and, 2) whether spatial search patterns are sensitive to the cost of time incurred in 
traversing the space. To test this, we designed a spatial exploration task for humans with 
and without the cost of time (Methods). In phase 1 (with a time cost) of this task, subjects 
could stop an image of a flying albatross in order to reveal a fish at a given spatial location.  
The goal of the subjects was to build a model of the distribution of fish as the knowledge 
acquired during this exploration phase could then be used on one exploitation trial to collect 
the largest fish possible. Crucially, flying longer distances across the screen took 
proportionally more time (the longest distance corresponded to waiting 10 seconds). 
Unknown to the subjects was that the distribution of fish sizes at any given location was 
uniform between fixed bounds. To test path lengths in the absence of a time-cost, we 
removed the distance-time relationship in phase 2 and allowed the subjects to explore by 
merely clicking a given location with a computer mouse. In other words, they no longer 
had to wait for the albatross to fly to that location. 
We found that in both phases, the pattern of search was non-random. Subjects 
systematically explored the space by, for instance, undertaking longer and longer path 
lengths or undertaking shorter and shorter path lengths from the end of the screen (Figure 
18b). Statistically, the probability of finding bouts of positive path length differences or 
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negative path length differences between consecutive paths was higher than chance in 
every subject for phase 2 (p<0.05, runs test with Benjamini-Hochberg correction for 
multiple comparisons, n=12). For phase 1, the non-randomness in the search was 
statistically significant in 10 out of 12 subjects (p<0.05, runs test with Benjamini-Hochberg 
correction for multiple comparisons). Thus, human spatial search in this random 
environment is not random. This conclusion is also bolstered by prior studies 
demonstrating that numerous animals remember spatial locations to produce non-random 
spatial search patterns in the wild (196, 211–217). We also found that the distribution of 
path lengths in phase 1 was significantly different from that in phase 2 (Figure 18c; 
p<0.001, two-tailed two sample Kolmogorov Smirnov test) due to the cost of time, as 
predicted by our temporal discounting model. Thus, human data supports two key 
predictions of our model, viz. that spatial search by cognitively complex agents is 
systematic and non-random and that temporal discounting plays a fundamental role in the 
shaping of such search. These datasets are relatively small, however—as it is difficult to 
encourage human subjects to explore for long periods in a laboratory setting—and, 
therefore, are insufficient for model comparisons (though our model is consistent with the 
data).  Therefore, to perform model comparisons, where a considerable amount of data is 
required, we turned to foraging data in the wild where, in some instances, thousands of 
path lengths have been recorded from individual animals. 
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Figure 18 Human spatial exploration task with and without temporal costs 
a. Schematic of the computer task (Methods): In phase 1, an albatross flies across the 
screen from a “nest” at a constant speed. Thus, the flight time is proportional to the 
distance flown. The farthest end of the ocean corresponds to ten seconds of flight time. In 
phase 2, subjects can make the albatross jump to a spot (i.e. teleport). Thus, flight time is 
independent of distance and is zero. b. Data from example subjects showing systematic 
search behavior across space. c. Raw CDF of the population data across subjects for 
phase 1 and phase 2 showing sensitivity of exploration to the cost of time. 
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4.4 Results: Path length distributions of wild animals are well-
fit by a hyperbolic model  
Given the preponderance of evidence that foraging path lengths are well-fit by the power 
law distribution (74, 184–187), the immediate question to be addressed is whether the 
hyperbolic distribution of path lengths expected from Equation 
Error! Reference source not found. can be well-described by a power law. Since the 
above distribution (and a power law) is defined in a bounded domain, we tested against a 
truncated power law (see Methods for details). We found that for random numbers 
generated using Equation Error! Reference source not found., Akaike Information 
Criterion weights (wAIC) overwhelmingly supports a truncated power law compared to a 
truncated exponential (wAICtp=1.000 and wAICexp=0.000) for all parameters tested (Figure 
19a). 
At this point, we wondered whether previously analyzed foraging data (187) may be well-
explained by our model. For this analysis, we compared a hyperbolic model to a power law 
model, as the power law distribution was found to provide a good fit to the data (187) and 
is generally compared against the exponential distribution to assert the presence of Lévy 
walks (74, 76, 184–186, 188, 189).  To be clear, we compared against the power law 
distribution, not the family of distributions which have power-law distributions at their 
asymptotic limits—to which a hyperbolic and power law model both belong.  One 
important point to note here is that while a strict power-law distribution is a special case of 
the hyperbolic distribution, it is not trivially true that in a direct comparison between the 
two models, the data will be better fit by a hyperbolic distribution. Specifically, a 
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hyperbolic distribution will have a faster decay at large values and slower decay at small 
values when compared to the closest power law. Thus, for real data that are approximated 
by a power law (better than an exponential distribution), it may well be that the data is 
inconsistent with this specific prediction for a hyperbolic model. In such a case, the best fit 
hyperbolic model will reduce to the best fit power law and hence, model selection (by 
wAIC) would favor the pure power-law model over the hyperbolic model owing to fewer 
parameters. 
Since differentiating between two highly similar distributions requires considerable 
statistical power, we limited our test to eight individual marine animals, comprising four 
blue sharks Prionace glauca (PG) and four basking sharks Cetorhinus maximus (CM), for 
which a substantial number of path lengths (>10,000) were recorded. The results for two 
individuals, blue sharks PG2 and PG4, are shown in Figure 19b and c, respectively.  In 
both cases, the hyperbolic fit (cyan) provides an excellent fit to the data.  Notably, the 
truncated power law fit is visually compelling for PG2 (Figure 19b) but not PG4 (Figure 
19c).  Indeed, individual PG2 represents a typical case where the fits are not easily 
distinguishable visually (as in the simulation in Figure 19a), but where the wAIC 
overwhelmingly favors a hyperbolic model. Examining all individuals, we found that the 
hyperbolic model provided a superior explanation of the data when compared to power law 
and exponential models in all but one individual (Table 1). In this individual (CM3), the 
exponential model provided the best fit, potentially due to prey encounter-related 
truncation (186). In all other cases, the hyperbolic model was overwhelmingly favored 
(wAIC=1.000), except in PG3 where support was not as clear-cut (wAIC=.708). Hence, 
our theoretical model provides a superior fit to previously collected foraging data.   
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Figure 19 Previously collected data from wild animals is well-fit by a hyperbolic model 
than a power law model 
a. Random data generated from a hyperbolic distribution (blue dots) can be well-
approximated by a power law distribution (red), but not by an exponential distribution 
(green): 25000 random numbers were generated from a hyperbolic distribution (Equation 
2; Methods) with truncation set to be between 10 and 1000. The best fit truncated power 
law describes the data significantly better than the best fit exponential (wAICtp=1.000 and 
wAICexp=0.000).  b. Previously collected data (blue dots) that is well fit by a hyperbolic 
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model (cyan) and power law model (red), but not an exponential model (green).  c. Data 





 Type xmin 
xmax 
 
µpl µhyp chyp 
KS D statistic wAIC 
pl hyp exp pl hyp exp 
CM1 Disc 1 322 -1.19 -1.41 1.19 0.061 0.026 0.356 <10-6 1.000 <10-6 
CM2 Disc 6 91 -2.07 -3.03 7.20 0.056 0.083 0.127 <10-6 1.000 <10-6 
CM3 Disc 7 68 -1.49 -8 88.64 0.077 0.051 0.059 1×10-91 1×10-11 1.000 
CM4 Disc 7 63 -1.44 -1.79 4.25 0.015 0.007 0.061 2×10-4 1.000 <10-6 
PG1 Disc 2 185 -2.10 -2.24 0.36 0.013 0.003 0.248 <10-6 1.000 <10-6 
PG2 Disc 3 185 -1.63 -1.82 1.23 0.022 0.007 0.219 <10-6 1.000 <10-6 
PG3 Disc 4 218 -1.70 -1.77 0.57 0.025 0.018 0.222 0.292 0.708 <10-6 
PG4 Cont 0.027 87.3 -1.38 -1.90 0.13 0.150 0.031 0.376 <10-6 1.000 <10-6 
 
Table 1 Results of fitting truncated power law (pl), truncated hyperbolic (hyp) and 
truncated exponential models to data previously collected from individual marine animals. 
 
CM, basking shark; PG, blue shark. The first seven animals had quantized data 
(Type=Disc) that could be considered as resulting from a discrete probability distribution. 
For these animals, we divided the data by their common factor to get the discrete data (e.g. 
the first animal had unique observations 1,2,3,…,322). xmin and xmax represents the best fit 
truncation across all three distributions (Methods).  The best fit parameters, goodness of fit 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic), and relative quality of fit (wAIC) are shown. 
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4.5 Results: Optimal exploration with noisy temporal 
representations 
In our model for foraging animals in the wild, we previously assumed perfect ability to 
estimate the time flown on a given step. Since we know that the error in estimating longer 
intervals is larger than that of smaller ones (218), we derived the optimal exploration model 
for the biologically realistic case in which time perception is subjective and noisy 
(Appendix). In this model, the sampling per bin of path length (or equivalently, real time) 
for maximizing discriminability of rewards associated with that path length will be 
determined by the degree of nonlinearity in time perception as different bins in subjective 
time are scaled differently depending on the non-linearity (Figure 20c). Theoretically, it 
has been proposed previously that the degree of non-linearity in time perception is directly 
related to the discounting function in subjective time (71) (Figure 20d, left). Consequently, 
we show—based on our prior theory of temporal perception and decision-making (71, 219–
221)—that the optimal path length distribution would be 
(3) 
Here, v is the speed of the animal. The term Time is the interval over which the past reward 
rate experienced by an animal is estimated so as to make appropriate intertemporal 
decisions that maximize reward rates (71, 219, 220). Importantly, this term governs the 
non-linearity of time perception and the steepness of temporal discounting (71, 219–221).  
Thus, the power-law that best approximates the above distribution would have an exponent 










It is important to note that the derivations mentioned above necessarily simplify the 
foraging problem faced by animals in the wild. For instance, one factor that we did not yet 
take into account is that animals might account for other sources of risk such as that 
resulting from competition in their exploratory model. In such a case, we show in the 
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where k and α represent the magnitude of competition such that an increase in their values 
represent more competition and hence, shorter path lengths. r in Equation (2) can  be 
thought of as the mean reward expected in an environment; the higher the mean reward 
expected, the larger the competition and shorter the path lengths. The asymptotic limit of 
Equation (2), for positive α, will have a power law exponent greater than 3 and hence, will 
be outside the Lévy range of exponents. However, in cases where the asymptotic limit 
cannot be reached, as is often the case in biology where path lengths are often truncated 
either by the physical world or potentially by some internal limit set by the forager, a best 
fit truncated power law will appear to have a lower exponent than the real generative 
process, with the apparent exponent lying between 0 and 3+1/α. 
An even more complete model of animal movements would involve additional factors. 
Nevertheless, the simplified model presented here demonstrates that path lengths of 
foragers with spatial memory that build a map of their environment for future exploitation 




Figure 20 Optimal exploration when temporal representations are noisy.  
a. Optimal algorithm for exploration. b. If temporal resolution is constant at every interval, 
subjective representation of time can be represented as a linear function of real time, with 
constant noise. However, it is known that errors in timing increase with the interval being 
timed (Buhusi and Meck, 2005b). In this case, subjective representation of time can be 
represented as a non-linear function with the non-linearity controlled by the parameter 
Time (Namboodiri et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). c. When subjective representation of time 
is non-linear (concave), equal bins in subjective time correspond to bins of increasing width 
in real time. d. A theory of reward-rate maximization (Namboodiri et al., 2014a, 2014b, 
2014c) predicts linear sampling for optimal exploration in subjective time, with the slope 
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determined by Time. In real time, this sampling becomes hyperbolic with its decay 
controlled by Time. 
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4.6 Materials and Methods 
4.6.1 Experimental Design  
Subjects 
The 12 subjects that participated in this experiment were healthy individuals aged 22-35 
recruited from Johns Hopkins University. All procedures were approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) and all subjects gave oral consent prior to the start of the 
experiment, as required by the IRB. 
Exploration Task 
We developed an exploration task for human subjects. Our task was divided into two 
phases.  At the start of each trial in phase 1, an image of an albatross would begin flying 
(i.e. moving) from its “nest” left to right across the “sky” (i.e. light blue patch of screen).  
Subjects were instructed to stop the albatross at any point by clicking a mouse.  When the 
albatross was stopped, it would instantaneously dive into the “water” (i.e. dark blue patch 
of screen) and an image of a fish would be revealed.  Unknown to the subject, the size of 
the fish was drawn from a uniform distribution with five discrete outcomes.  After the fish 
was displayed for 1 second, the albatross returned to its nest and immediately began to fly 
in the next trial. 
In phase 1, it would take the albatross 10 seconds to fly the entire length of the screen.  The 
speed of the albatross was constant and was 109 pixels per second.  If the subject waited 
for the albatross to traverse the entire screen (i.e. waited 10 seconds), the albatross 
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automatically dove into the water and a fish was revealed.  This only happened on rare 
occasions, however, as the subjects usually stopped the albatross well short of 10 seconds. 
Prior to the start of phase 1, subjects were informed that they would have exactly 3 minutes 
to explore the region and “discover where the biggest fish swim.”  They were also informed 
that at the end of the phase, they would be given just one chance to catch the largest fish 
they could and that their payout would be “determined exclusively by the size of the fish 
on this one trial” and not by the fish caught during exploration.  In this way, the subjects 
were incentivized to explore the region. 
Following phase 1, phase 2 began.  In phase 2, the subjects were instructed that the 
albatross was flying over a different region of the ocean and, thus, they had to explore again 
to know where the biggest fish swim. The albatross remained in its nest until the subject 
clicked on a region of space (as indicated by a gray region that ran the length of the screen) 
to which it instantaneously teleported.  Therefore, there was no time cost in exploring 
farther regions of space, as there was in phase 1.  The instructions for phase 2 were similar 
to those for phase 1 except that subjects were informed that they had 1 minute to explore 
the region. This limit was imposed so that subjects would complete a similar number of 
trials in phase 1 and phase 2 (since trials in phase 2 are shorter as the albatross teleports 
rather than flies).  Aesthetic changes (background color, fish image, and fish size) were 
made between phases to encourage exploration by underscoring the instruction that the 
environments in phase 1 and 2 were distinct. 
Procedure 
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Subjects were placed in a quiet room in front of a 13-inch MacBook Pro.  On-screen 
instructions were read aloud by the experimenter to ensure that the subject understood 
them.  At the end of the experiment, subjects answered a questionnaire administered by 
the experimenter and were monetarily compensated for their participation. 
Display 
The experiment was controlled by custom-made code written in Java (JDK 6.0_65).  The 
display was 1220 pixels wide and 730 pixels high.  The area of the fish image (i.e. the size 
of the fish) was a random integer value between 1 and 5 scaled by a constant factor.   
4.6.2 Animal foraging data 
Blue (n = 4) and basking sharks (n = 4) were each fitted with a pressure-sensitive data 
logger that recorded an individual time series of depth measurements as the fish swam 
through the water column, as described previously (187). Raw depth measurements from 
loggers were converted into move step-lengths (the distance between consecutive turns) by 
calculating the vertical movement step (in m) between successive vertical changes in 
direction (from down to up and vice versa), as described previously (187). 
4.6.3 Procedure to fit data 
The general approach used here to test the appropriateness of different models is to 1) 
estimate the respective parameters using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) for the 
same set of possible truncations across all models, 2) set the best truncation to that resulting 
in the lowest Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) D statistic across all models and all truncations, 
and 3) quantify relative likelihoods of models using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
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The truncated hyperbolic-like distribution, shown in Equation (2), needed to be statistically 
characterized (Appendix). The truncated power law distribution is a particular example of 
a truncated hyperbolic distribution for c=0. To test whether data generated from this 
distribution can be mistaken for a power law distribution, we generated data using the 
following random number generator 
 
1
1 1 1 1
min max min( ) ( ) ( )t t c t c t c u c
                
where t is the random variate following the truncated hyperbolic-like distribution, tmin and 
tmax are the minimum and maximum truncation limits, c and µ are the parameters of the 
distribution, and u is a uniform random variate. For the purpose of 0, tmin was set at 10 and 
tmax at 1000. The procedure for fitting and testing of power law, hyperbolic and exponential 
models is explained below. 
We fit the data using three models: exponential, truncated power law, and truncated 
hyperbolic.  As discussed in prior work1,2, upper truncation is important for power law and 
hyperbolic models, but not exponential models, as such heavy-tailed models cannot last for 
an infinite domain in the real world. Additionally, a lower truncation is necessary for the 
power law model as it is not defined for a flight time of zero. Consequently, as done 
previously1,2, we used a truncation for all the models tested. Unlike before, however, we 
did not tune the truncation parameters to each model.  Rather, we tuned them across all 
models by picking the truncation that resulted in the lowest Kolmogorov Smirnov D-
statistic across all models and all truncations. The different values of the truncation tested 
were as follows: for discrete data, the low truncation possibilities were set to 1, 2,…, 7 and 
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the upper truncation to 80th , 84th,…, 100th percentiles of the unique observations in the 
data, whereas for continuous data, the possible options for the minimum truncation were 
set to 0th, 4th,…, 20th percentiles and the upper truncation was chosen from 80, 84, …100 
(percentile) for which at least 80% of the data was retained. Thus, if the lower truncation 
was set to 20th percentile, the upper truncation had to be the 100th percentile, whereas the 
possible upper truncations with a lower truncation of 16th percentile were 96th and 100th 
percentiles. Thus, truncation limits are not free-fitting parameters for each distribution that 
add cost to the AIC. The benefit of using this approach is that the exact same data is used 
for comparison across all the models, thus avoiding different domains of the probability 
distribution functions for the different distributions tested. 
The ML estimate for the exponent in the truncated power law model was numerically 
calculated by solving Equation (16). Similarly, the ML estimate for c and µ for the 
truncated hyperbolic model was numerically calculated by solving equations (14) and (15)
.  Lastly, the ML estimate for the truncated exponential model was calculated by solving 
Equations (23) or (25). 
We used AIC to compare the three models. Since the truncation parameters were set to be 
the same for all models, these were not counted as free-fit parameters in the calculation of 
AIC. Thus, the AIC for the different models were calculated as shown below (each AIC 
was calculated using the correction for small sample sizes, i.e. they were AICc). The 
numbers of free-fit parameters for the different models were: one for “tp”, one for “exp”, 
and, two for “hyp”. 
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In this work, we first argued that even though natural environments of foragers are often 
highly stochastic such that remembering reward distributions associated with a specific 
location might not be useful, there still might be additional statistical regularities that 
cognitively complex foragers may exploit. Specifically, if foragers aim to build models of 
reward distribution across relative space, we showed that an optimal model of exploration 
would require sampling in proportion to the uncertainty of subjective value associated with 
a reward obtained after a given path length. Since it is often observed that the subjective 
value of rewards obtained after a delay is discounted hyperbolically with respect to the 
delay, we showed that the resultant path lengths would be hyperbolically distributed. In 
support of our model, we found that humans engaged in a laboratory exploration task 
searched space systematically and account for the cost of time in traversing space.  Next, 
we showed that data generated from a hyperbolic distribution is better fit by a power law 
distribution than an exponential distribution and that previously collected data from 
foraging animals in the wild can be better explained by a hyperbolic model than a power 
law model. Additionally, we extended our model to show that for foragers in the wild with 
noisy temporal perception, the exponent of the best fit power law is governed by the non-
linearity of time perception and the amount of competition faced from other foragers. Thus, 
we argue that search patterns in complex agents are unlikely to be purely random in 
situations where cognitive modeling is advantageous, and that approximate power-law path 
lengths emerge due to the temporal discounting of farther rewards. Hence, our model 
provides a novel and principled way of understanding search patterns and, thus, contributes 
to the ongoing discussion regarding the mechanistic origins of power-law path lengths in 
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foragers (222–233).  
It is important to note that the human exploratory task presented here has superficial 
differences from the general model of exploration of relative space that was proposed 
earlier for foragers in the wild. The main difference is that while foragers in the wild were 
predicted to explore relative locations in space (i.e. locations relative to their current 
position), humans in this task are exploring absolute locations in space (i.e. locations 
relative to a fixed location). However, there is a fundamental equivalence between both 
cases in that exploration is performed with respect to the distance traveled on each search 
bout.  In this sense, exploration of absolute space in one dimension is just a special case of 
exploration in relative space.  Consequently, the discounting of rewards for future 
exploitation is defined with respect to the distance traveled during exploratory bouts in 
both cases. Thus, our laboratory task provides a test for the conceptual framework we 
developed here. 
In the following section, we consider potential predicted deviations from the simplified 
model presented here. We presented a model for animal movements in the wild by 
assuming that animals are building a model of the subjective value of reward distributions 
across relative space. Our calculations would thus be expected to be true only when animals 
are in fact building such a model. Since animals would likely not spend their entire foraging 
time building such a model, in these cases, one must expect deviations from the hyperbolic 
distribution of path lengths predicted here. One such instance would be when animals are 
exploiting knowledge gained from the aforementioned exploration. If foragers realized that 
there is indeed a scale over which prey are distributed across space, they would fly these 
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distances under exploitation. Thus, for exploitation, one would predict unimodal 
distributions of path lengths if the foragers are flying an optimal distance. Another 
prediction of our framework would be that paths of foragers might show directional 
preferences. If there is anisotropic autocorrelation in the spatial distribution of prey, the 
foragers would likely also learn the optimal angle to travel. Thus, one would predict non-
uniform spread of directions of travel.  
Further, even when foragers are building a model of subjective value of reward 
distributions across relative space, our calculations have ignored complications such as 
models of risk associated, for instance, with competition from other foragers. These 
complications would introduce quantitative deviations from the simplified framework 
presented here (see Section 0). On a related note, it must also be pointed out that optimizing 
discriminability between all choices is not required to optimize the ability to pick the 
maximum reward in a static environment. However, since reward environments are rarely 
static, it is likely that animals evolved a mechanism to build models of the world 
appropriate for mapping the entire distribution of subjective values. Another caveat is in 
relation to the dimensionality of the environment to explore. Here, the assumption was that 
the dependence of interest to the animal is on the distance from the previous reward (i.e. 
autocorrelation). This results in a 1-D exploration problem irrespective of the 
dimensionality of the environment. Further, we have assumed radial symmetry in 
autocorrelation. Despite these caveats, our calculations illustrate how path lengths of 
foragers in the wild can be heavy-tailed, as experimentally observed. 
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 130 
V.M.K.N., J.M.L., S.M. and M.G.H.S were involved in the conceptualization of the 
theoretical contributions. V.M.K.N., J.M.L. and M.G.H.S. designed the experimental 
contribution. J.M.L. wrote the program for the experimental paradigm. D.W.S. provided 
previously collected foraging data in the wild. V.M.K.N. performed the analyses with 
help from J.M.L. and wrote the manuscript with help from J.M.L., S.M., D.W.S. and 
M.G.H.S.  V.M.K.N. and J.M.L. contributed equally to this work.  
 
 131 
Chapter 5. General discussion 
In the previous chapters, we described elements of three key aspects of visually-guided 
timing: interval generation, storage and evaluation.  In this chapter, we briefly summarize 
our findings, discuss their relationship to one another, and describe their implications for 
models of timing.   
In Chapter 2, we found evidence for behaviorally-relevant interval generation at the earliest 
stage of cortical visual processing, the primary visual cortex (V1).  Specifically, we found 
that reward-seeking timed behavior tracks distinct theta oscillation states in V1.  During 
these states, both the behavioral precision and accuracy on the timing task was much 
improved, and the degree of improvement was largest when the oscillatory signal was 
spatially widespread.  Importantly, the duration of these oscillations covaries with the 
timing of the reward-seeking action on a per trial basis.  Surprisingly, using these LFP-
defined states to separate single unit activity revealed otherwise unappreciated patterns of 
activity.  We devised a strategy to capture these activity patterns using spikes trains alone 
and found that behavioral performance on the timing task improved during periods of high 
coherence.  Finally, we found that the prevalence of these states covaried with the rate of 
experienced reward, thus linking them to motivation and the balance between exploration 
and exploitation.  Together, these findings point to a behavioral role for theta oscillations 
in V1, and for interval generation even at the earliest level of sensory cortex. 
In Chapter 3, we described drawbacks with current methods of measuring temporal storage, 
highlighting classification, in which subjects must assess whether a given interval is more 
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similar to a short or long reference interval.  Specifically, we described the possible sources 
of noise in measuring the temporal bisection point, the sample interval at which subjects 
are equally likely to label an interval as “short” or “long”, and the implications its 
measurement has for theories of timing.  One prominent source of bias in the bisection 
point may arise from noisy memory processes, as memory is a fundamental component of 
mechanistic models of time perception, and we therefore sought to directly measure 
memory biases by creating a novel task, “Bisection by Classification and Production” 
(BiCaP).  Using this task, we found that the classification bisection point varied with the 
bias-corrected arithmetic mean (calculated from the mean produced time of the short and 
long reference intervals) and covaried with the production bisection point.  In addition, we 
found evidence for within-subject covariation between the production bisection point and 
the mean of the remembered reference intervals across the session.  Together, these 
findings suggest that memory bias can contribute to the variability in interval storage, thus 
highlighting the need to account for it in experimental measurements and theoretical 
models.   
In Chapter 4, we discussed interval evaluation through the lens of studying how 
cognitively-complex foragers use temporal information to efficiently forage.  We found 
that an agent who maximizes information about temporally-discounted outcomes will 
exhibit search patterns which are well-approximated by power-law path lengths (which 
have been extensively observed in nature (180–186), but are, in fact, hyperbolic.  We test 
our model with data collected from humans engaged in a laboratory exploration task and 
animals foraging in the wild and find that key predictions of our model are supported, 
including that our hyperbolic model outperforms extant models in describing the data.  We 
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also extend our model to the realistic case in which temporal estimates are subjective and 
noisy.  Together, our results provide a compelling demonstration of how interval evaluation 
may impact complex decisions.  
Though investigated independently, the aspects of timing investigated in each of these 
chapters are intimately related.  In fact, in each chapter there are implicit references to the 
other aspects of timing.  Though we focused on interval generation in Chapter 2, 
successfully accomplishing the task requires that the rodents store information about the 
interval (storage) and attach behavioral significance to it (evaluation).   Though we focused 
on interval storage in Chapter 3, subjects also needed to generate intervals in order to 
produce them.  Finally, though we focused on interval evaluation in Chapter 4, making 
optimal foraging decision requires that animals had experience with (generation) and stored 
prior intervals.  This is not a coincidence: most real-world timing behaviors require these 
multiple aspects of timing.   
This gives us hope that we can understand the multiple axes of interval timing, and 
rationalize our findings, within a unified framework.  At a high level, our results support a 
view in which a behavioral arc proceeds sequentially from interval generation to storage to 
evaluation.  First, given that timing-related theta oscillations are observed at even the 
earliest level of cortical processing, primary visual cortex (Chapter 2), they may be a 
common mechanism of interval generation.  Second, since memory biases in interval 
production correlate with movements in classification measurements (Chapter 3), interval 
storage and generation are likely to rely on at least partially overlapping mechanisms.  
Lastly, complex evaluations take place on these stored intervals, as demonstrated by spatial 
 134 
exploration patterns in foraging (Chapter 4).  Thus, interval generation, storage, and 
evaluation may be explicitly connected.   
At a finer resolution, we can assess whether our results are consistent with extant timing 
models, such as the influential Pacemaker-Accumulator model (58).  In this model, a 
pacemaker outputs discrete ticks which are counted by an accumulator and, subsequently, 
sent to working and long-term memory.  Temporal classification decisions are then made 
by comparing the interval in working memory with the reference interval stored in long-
term-memory.  Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET) (57) is the most commonly cited 
implementation of a PA model.  Traditionally, the pacemaker in SET has been 
conceptualized as a centralized apparatus emitting Poisson-distributed pulses.  Yet, this 
idea has fallen out of favor as evidence for such a pacemaker is lacking (234).  On the other 
hand, many examples of emergent oscillatory activity have been found.  Along this line, 
the type of oscillatory activity we observed in primary visual cortex (Chapter 2) would 
serve as an excellent pacemaker: its output is highly structured and consistent and offers a 
high signal-to-noise ratio.  In fact, such oscillatory activity has been proposed as a 
pacemaker before (59). Our data also supports the notion of a distinct memory store for 
intervals; we found that biases in memory for specific durations could account for shifts in 
the temporal bisection point better than generalized shifts in clock-speed (Chapter 3).  
These memory effects could also be dissociated from an accumulator, as drift occurred 
even in the absence of new reference interval presentation.  Such separation among the 
various components of the PA has also been supported by pharmacological studies showing 
a clear dissociation between effects on clock speed and memory (60).  On the other hand, 
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it has been difficult to find a neural instantiation of the accumulator, leading some to 
question (for this and other reasons) the plausibility of the PA model (155, 234, 235).  
Partially to address the shortcomings of the PA model, the Striatal Beat Frequency (SBF) 
model has been developed.  In contrast to the PA model, it makes very concrete 
assumptions about the neural underpinnings of interval generation and storage.  In the SBF 
model, a bank of cortical oscillators at different frequencies are synchronized (reset) at trial 
onset by dopaminergic projections form the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA) and Substantia 
Nigra Pars Compacta (SNpc), and downstream neurons in the striatum listen to their output 
(66).  These medium spiny neurons of the striatum act as coincidence detectors, comparing 
the pattern of activity across the cortical oscillators to the pattern they exhibited at the 
termination of a previously presented interval.  (As others have pointed out, however, it is 
not entirely clear, how the comparison to the remembered pattern is performed (234)).  It 
is biologically plausible that coincidence detection is subserved by medium spiny neurons 
of the striatum, as cortico-striatal loops are known to be a robust feature of neural 
processing.  In addition, the type of time-related oscillatory activity we observed in V1 
(Chapter 2) is more in-line with the SBF model than the PA model, as the SBF model has 
at its core the assumption that multiple cortical oscillators contribute to timing (7). The fact 
that we observe this activity at even the earliest stage of visual processing also adds weight 
to the proposition that time perception is a distributed feature of local circuits rather than 
the providence of a single, centralized clock. 
While aspects of both the PA and SBF models are consistent with the data presented here, 
neither deals explicitly with interval evaluation—that is, the process by which these 
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temporal memories are used for atemporal decision-making.  For such decision-making, 
these temporal memories must be translated into a currency of valuation.  At a behavioral 
level, considerable evidence points to the fact humans and animals discount delayed 
rewards hyperbolically (67); such a discounting model was used to explain foraging 
patterns of wild animals and humans in Chapter 4.  At a neural level, it has been suggested 
that Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC) outputs a discounted subjective value signal, as most 
neurons within it fire more strongly to a reward delivered after a shorter delay (236) and 
lesions to it can result in less impulsive behavior (237).  This region also seems to provide 
a prospective subjective value signal, as many neurons modulate their firing depending on 
whether a cue is predictive of a short or long delay (236, 238).  (There has even been a 
popular proposal that the OFC translates a range of parameters into a common value 
currency (239–241), yet, contrary to this, it has been shown that storage of reward size and 
delay are dissociable (236)).  The Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA) has also been implicated 
in prospective reporting of subjective value; these dopamine neurons have been found to 
respond more weakly for learned stimuli associated with more delayed rewards, according 
to a hyperbolic function (242).  In humans, fMRI studies have also implicated the ventral 
striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex in encoding the subjective 
value of delayed monetary rewards (243).  It is important to note that these observations 
do not explain precisely how this translative computation to subjective value occurs, how 
it is used, or why it follows a hyperbolic function.  Recent work has shed light on the latter 
question, suggesting that a hyperbolic-like function emerges if an agent is seeking to 
optimize its reward rate, given some particular constraints (71).  This theory—known as 
TIMERR (for Training-Integrated Maximized Estimation of Reinforcement Rate)—also 
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accounts for the fundamental observation that the degree of discounting is context-specific 
and varies across and within individuals. 
While this theory deals with the situation in which the agent already has complete 
information about its environment, it does not address how temporal information factors 
into decision-making when there is incomplete knowledge of the environment.  We deal 
with such a situation in Chapter 4, and find that the hyperbolic path length distributions 
exhibited by foragers can be explained by a model which factors in the temporal discounts 
associated with searching distant regions.  But what neural substrates might underlie 
generation of these path lengths?   The answer probably involves a combination of regions, 
including hippocampal cells representing spatial information (244–246), prefrontal cortical 
cells involved in movement planning (247), and midbrain, striatal, and prefrontal neurons 
involved in temporal discounting (236, 242, 243).  There has even been a suggestion that 
evidence for superdiffusive movement paths can be decoded directly from the neural 
dynamics within CA1 and motor neurons (246).  Therefore, interval evaluation involves 
coordination of various, disparate brain regions.  
Understanding the precise mechanistic underpinnings of interval generation, storage, and 
evaluation is important not only because it sheds light on normal brain function but also 
because it provides a window into pathological disease.  Parkinson’s disease, which is 
characterized by cell death in the Substantia Nigra Pars Compacta (SNpc), leading to a 
reduction in dopamine levels and concomitant ataxia, is a prime example of this.  Indeed, 
dopamine is considered an important neurotransmitter in both PA and SBF models of 
timing (7) and depletion of dopamine levels in Parkinson’s patients appears to affect 
interval timing: Parkinson’s patients have a hard time keeping the timing associated with 
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two stimuli separate; in reproducing these intervals, they regress toward the mean of the 
two intervals (248). Further, these patients fail to exhibit the scalar timing property—the 
fundamental property in which the coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) is 
constant across the temporal range—when tested off their L-dopa medication.  Very 
recently, a direct connection between dopamine and timing at the seconds range was 
observed through optogenetic manipulation of midbrain dopamine cells (249).  Timing 
deficits in schizophrenic and severely depressed individuals have added weight to the 
hypothesis that dopamine depletion adversely impacts time perception (250).  Patients with 
Huntington’s disease, a genetic disorder characterized by a mutation in the Huntington 
protein which leads to a degeneration of medium spiny neurons in the striatum early on in 
disease progression, have also exhibited deficits in time perception. For example, patients 
that are predicted to show imminent onset of the disease show hypoactivation of the 
putamen, thalamus, pre-SMA, and cingulate areas, and corresponding deficits in timing 
performance compared to healthy controls and patients where predicted disease onset will 
not occur for many years (251).  This implicates dysfunction in the thalamo-cortico-striatal 
loop, which is relevant in both PA and SBF timing models, in timing impairments in 
Huntington’s patients. This connection is bolstered by the finding that there is hypoactivity 
in the putamen, thalamus, and medial prefrontal cortex of schizophrenic patients exhibiting 
impaired duration discrimination (252).  Finally, diseases which principally affect short-
term memory, such as Alzheimer’s disease, have also been linked to impairments in time 
perception (253).  Together, these observations provide insight into the fundamental 
mechanisms of timing and, simultaneously, help us better understand what goes awry in 
these pathological illnesses. 
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In this thesis, we have attempted to relate our findings to cohesive frameworks of timing 
and time perception.  It is important to note, however, that we have neglected several forms 
of timing.  This raises the question: are the myriad forms of timing reconcilable into a 
single, comprehensive framework?  At the macro scale, circadian rhythms govern our 
biological clocks, and rely heavily on the superchiasmatic nucleus in the hypothalamus.  
Given that disruptions of circadian rhythms in mice have no observable effect on interval 
timing, it seems that these processes are orthogonal (254). At the millisecond scale, motor 
timing  guides our behavior (128) and research has suggested that it relies on different 
mechanisms from interval timing in the seconds range (6).  Indeed, whereas lesion studies 
have strongly implicated the cerebellum in millisecond timing (255) and maintaining 
balance (256, 257), it appears to not be necessary for interval timing (258, 259).  Thus, it 
seems reasonable to develop distinct models for these different temporal regimes.  At some 
point, however, perhaps in translating a cognitively-timed decision to a split-second 
subconsciously-timed action, these systems likely interact, and studying their intersection 




Derivations for optimal foraging under different constraints  
As explained in the main text, we assume that animals are mapping out a distribution of 
subjective reward values across relative space (i.e. distances traveled). To this end, we 
assume that they maintain a constant speed and are mapping out the distribution of rewards 
against the time flown on each step length (Figure 16). The aim for such an exploration is 
to sample each option a given number of times to build a map of the reward distribution 
across relative space for future exploitation. Since it is known that the subjective value of 
a delayed reward decays systematically with respect to the delay (e.g. “which do you prefer: 
$100 now or $100 in a year?”), exploration of relative space should also consider the 
subjective value of a reward for a given flight time. In other words, the exploration of a 
given flight time must be done under consideration of its utility for future exploitation. We 
also assume that the search space for exploration is bounded by the forager to be between 
a minimum (tmin) and a maximum flight time (tmax). Note that we are using symbols for time 
here but they can easily be converted to distance as time=distance/speed. This conversion 
obviously applies to the case of constant speed, but also to the case where speed is variable, 
but independent of distance flown.    
If there were no discounts (subjective value of a delayed reward divided by the subjective 
value of that reward when obtained immediately) associated with time and all flight times 
are expected to have the same reward distribution, the optimal manner to map out the 
reward-flight time relationship would be to sample all possible flight times equally and 
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note the corresponding reward amounts. Such a sampling strategy would lead to a uniform 
distribution of sample times between tmin and tmax. 
However, when different time intervals have different associated discounts, the problem of 
optimal sampling becomes non-trivial. We first solve this problem for the simpler case of 
two possible flight time options (similar to the “two-armed bandit” problem), under the 
following assumptions: 
1) As in our behavioral task, the environment is stationary such that the reward 
distribution associated with any option does not change in time. 
2) The aim of exploration is to ascertain the optimal option for future exploitation. 
3) The total number of trials to explore is fixed. The aim of the agent is to calculate 
how to sample the two different options while keeping the total number of trials 
fixed. This assumption will be relaxed later to also consider a) the case where the 
total time for exploration is fixed, and b) a case where the stopping of exploration 
has to be determined by the forager.  
4) The agent has access to the standard error of the mean of an option after n 
samplings. 
We first consider the case where total number of trials for exploration is fixed. 
Total number of trials for exploration fixed 
With the above assumptions, the problem faced by the agent is exactly the same as the 
problem faced in designing an optimal experiment so as to maximize one’s ability to 
distinguish between the mean of two distributions. The solution for the optimal experiment 
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design is to sample each option in such a way that the t-statistic between the two 
distributions can be maximized. Hence, for the agent trying to solve the optimal exploration 
problem, the task is to maximize the t-statistic between the subjective value distributions 
of the two options. Since the variances of the subjective values for the options will not be 
same owing to the multiplicative discounts, one has to use Welch’s t-statistic for unequal 
variances (260), which is defined as: 
𝑡 =  
< 𝑥1 >  − < 𝑥2 >
𝜎𝑑
 
where xi is the subjective value for option ‘i’, <x> denotes the expected value of x and σd 
refers to the standard error of the difference of means. Since the number of samplings of 
either option only affects σd, maximizing the t-statistic is the same as minimizing σd. 
If the distributions of rewards for each option are independent and identical, with a standard 
deviation σ, σd—the standard error of the difference of subjective means of the two 
options—would be: 









where d1 and d2 are the discounts associated with the two options, and n1 and n2 are the 
number of times the two options were sampled. Given that the total number of trials is 
constant (N), n2 = N-n1.  
Minimizing σd is equivalent to minimizing the square of σd. At the minimum of the square 
of σd, the derivative of σd






















The second derivative can be verified to be positive at this solution, showing that σd is 
indeed at its minimum for the above solution. 
Hence, for a binary choice between options with independent and identically distributed 
(i.i.d) reward distributions but with different discounts, optimal exploration requires 
sampling in proportion to the discounts. 
Next, we extend this analysis to the case of k options (“k-armed bandits”), each having i.i.d 
reward distributions with different discounts, dk. While it is hard to identify a single metric 
whose optimality can identify the option with the maximum subjective value, one can 
define the optimality metric as the sum of variances of the difference distributions for each 
distinct pair of options. Minimizing this metric will lead to maximum discriminability 
between all options. Hence, for the k-option case, we assume that the aim of the agent is to 
maximize the ability to distinguish between the subjective rewards of the k options. With 
this assumption, the agent has to minimize 
𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑡






ij is the standard error of the difference of the expected subjective rewards of 
options i and j. 




























































Collecting like terms,  
𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑡







Since the total number of trials is constant, nk can be written as . 
At the minimum of σnet












(𝑁 − ∑ 𝑛𝑗𝑗,𝑗<𝑘 )2







 , 𝑖 < 𝑘 
Hence, even in the k-option case between options with i.i.d reward distributions but with 
different discounts, optimal exploration requires sampling in proportion to the discounts. 






It is important to point out that the optimal exploration requires sampling in proportion to 
the discounts only when comparing between options with i.i.d reward distributions. The 
general solution as we worked out for the case with different variances associated with the 
real values of each option is to sample in proportion to the estimated variance of the mean 
of the subjective values associated with that option (n α d2σ2/n ). It is interesting to point 
out that a similar strategy, in which exploration of an option was proportional to 
uncertainty, was assumed for some previous studies of exploratory behavior in humans 
(210, 261).  
Extending this to the continuous case, if we denote the probability of sampling the flight 
time t by p(t) and substitute a hyperbolic or a hyperbolic-like (202) discounting function 
for D(t), we get that for optimal exploration, assuming that flight time is proportional to 
distance traveled, 
   (1) 
where c and µ represent the two constants in the hyperbolic-like function. In other words, 
an optimal agent samples flight times in proportion to its hyperbolic-like discounting 
function. Equation (1) has been derived using the assumption that the bins in flight time 
(or relative spatial location) are linearly spaced. This in turn results from the assumption 
that the error in perception of time for each flight time is constant. This is an inaccurate 
assumption as it is known that errors in the representation of longer temporal intervals are 











Total time for exploration fixed 
Now, we solve for optimal exploration when the total time for exploration is fixed. As 
before, the aim is to minimize σd
 2
 but under the constraint that n1t1+n2t2=T, where T is the 
total time available for exploration. Taking the derivative with respect to n1, we get  
   
Thus,  
 
Thus the minimum of σd




For the case with k options, we have to minimize  































































under the constraint nk = T – (n1t1+….+nk-1tk-1). Taking the partial derivative with respect 
to any ni<k, we get 
 




Extending this to the continuous case, we get that when the total time for exploration is 
held constant, the probability of sampling a particular flight time must be  
(2) 
It is important to mention the caveats associated with the above model for optimality. It is 
defined as an extension of the optimal experimental design concept wherein the only aim 
 
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of the forager is to maximize the ability to discriminate between the means of the subjective 
values for different flight times. That is, the forager is seeking to purely explore the 
environment without exploiting its knowledge. The optimality is thus defined by this 
constraint. The second caveat associated with the above model is that it is only a steady-
state solution for optimality. In other words, it only says that at the steady state, the 
probability of sampling a given flight time is as expressed by Equations (1) and (2). It does 
not provide a dynamical solution and hence, does not predict how the sampling will 
develop with experience. For a discussion of this point, see Section 5. These equations also 
assume that every flight time is equally likely to contain the largest fish, i.e. that the prior 
is uniform. 
Self-initiated stopping rule for exploration 
With the above caveats in mind, we can now attempt to define a stopping rule for 
exploration. Such a rule would be useful when the exploration phase is not well-defined, 
as we assumed previously with fixed total samplings or fixed total time. A reasonable 
stopping rule can be defined as the moment when the net discriminability (1/σnet
2) goes 
above a threshold. This threshold might represent the maximum resolution available to the 
agent. In other words, sampling beyond this point affords no benefit to the agent in terms 
of new information about subjective value. A caveat of the above statement is that in some 
cases, there might be no need to exploit even after this threshold has been met. For instance, 
the total time available for exploration to a forager could be much more than that needed 
to meet the maximum discriminability threshold. In this case, further exploration can be 
aimed at gaining more information about the rewards themselves. Under this framework, 
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if there is infinite time to explore (i.e. no opportunity to exploit any knowledge gained), 
the forager will start sampling uniformly within the bounded search region.  
Mathematically, we can quantify the above mentioned stopping rule of maximum 
discriminability as the sampling when σnet
2= σstop
2. For this calculation, we assume that the 
forager is sampling each option in proportion to its uncertainty (or discount, assuming 
uniform prior). To calculate the sampling at the stoppage point, let us represent ni
stop=βdi. 
β can now be calculated as the value that satisfies 
 
Substituting ni
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As mentioned previously, if there is no possibility to exploit even after the above threshold 
has been met, the sampling will then be directed towards gathering more information about 
the rewards themselves. In this case, the steady-state sampling will be uniform. 
Exploration under noisy temporal estimation 
In the prior sections, we have assumed that errors in the representation of time are constant 
for every flight time. This is, however, not true. Hence, the sampling of different flight 
times will be done linearly with respect to the subjective representation of those intervals 
(Figure 20), rather than their real time values (as was previously assumed). In a previous 
theory on intertemporal decision-making and time perception (71, 219), we showed that a 
decision-making algorithm that considers reward rate maximization over limited temporal 
interval (including a past interval over which reward rate is estimated as well as the 
expected interval to future reward) explains well-established observations in intertemporal 
decision-making and time perception. In our theory, the subjective value of a delayed 
reward was calculated as  
(4) 
where SV(r,t) is the subjective value of a delayed reward of magnitude r and delay t, aest is 
the experienced reward rate estimated over the duration Time (referred to as “past integration 
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assumed to not be available during the delay to the current reward, resulting in an 
opportunity cost of the delay. If such an opportunity cost is not present or accounted for, 
the numerator in Equation (4) will not contain the aestt term. We also showed that the 
subjective representation of the delay t can be represented by 
(5) 
The above equation represents approximate scalar timing (error in timing grows in 
proportion to interval being timed (218)) and thus takes into account noisy temporal 
estimation. It says that the representation of time is non-linear and that this non-linearity is 
controlled by the past integration interval, Time. 
 
The subjective value of a delayed reward can be expressed in terms of the subjective 
representation of the delay as 
 
Thus, the discounting of a delayed reward is linear with respect to the subjective 
representation of the delay. It also has two components: one is an explicit cost of time (the 
first term on the R.H.S) and the second is the opportunity cost of time, expressed in terms 
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For exploration, the aim is to sample intervals keeping in mind the explicit cost of time. 
Thus the subjective value considered during exploration will not include the opportunity 
cost term. Hence, for exploration, 
 
Thus, the discounting function in terms of subjective representation of time is expressed 
as 
 
As was mentioned previously, the sampling under exploration will be done in subjective 
time and not real time. Thus, the sampling probability of a flight time t can be expressed 
(similar to Equation (1)) as  
(6) 
The corresponding sampling in real time can then be calculated as 
 
From Equation (5),  and from Equation (6), . 
Thus, 
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Or equivalently,  
(8) 
This equation is similar in form to Equation (1) but has a fixed power of 3. When Time→0, 
equation (8) predicts exploratory sampling with a power law with exponent= 3. When 
Time→∞, the R.H.S will be dominated by a constant and thus, the sampling will be uniform. 
Uniform sampling can also be approximated by a power law of exponent = 0. Thus, 
equation (8) predicts that optimal exploratory sampling of foragers in the wild will depend 
on their past integration interval—a quantity that measures future tolerance to delay in 
decision-making, and, the non-linearity of time perception.  
For a given value of Time, the closest power law fit to equation (8) can be calculated by 
equating the medians of the two distributions. This calculation is worked out below. 
From Equation (19), the median for Equation (8) can be expressed as 
  
1
2 2 2 2
min max min( ) 0.5 ( ) ( )ime ime ime imemedian x T x T x T T

             
From Equation (18), the median for the closest truncated power law can be expressed as 
 
1
1 1 1 1
min max min( ) 0.5( )
opt opt opt optmedian tp x x x




















Equating the two medians, the exponent (µopt) for the closest power law to Equation (8) is 
the solution to 
 
1 1
1 1 1 2 2 21 2
min max min min max min0.5( ) ( ) 0.5 ( ) ( )
opt opt opt opt
ime ime ime imex x x x T x T x T T
   

                   
 (9)     
This can only be calculated numerically and depends on the value of Time. When Time=0, it 
is easy enough to see that µopt=3. When Time→∞, the R.H.S of Equation (9) tends to the 
limit 0.5(xmax+xmin). Hence, the solution for µopt=0 in this case. Thus, in all cases, the 
exponent of the best fit power law to Equation (8) will be between 0 and 3.  
An important caveat needs to be mentioned regarding Equation (8). Its derivation assumes 
that the discounting function is calculated without any associated model of risk such as 
those resulting from competition due to other predators. These factors are quite likely 
important in determining the success of foragers in the wild and hence, would likely be 
included in their decision-making. However, to preserve simplicity, we have chosen to 
ignore such factors. Simple models of such risk can be found in the supplement of our prior 
theoretical work (71). When such factors are included in the discounting function, the 
resultant path length distribution would be much more complicated. Further, as mentioned 
in Section 0, the above model assumes a uniform prior. Hence, real life path lengths will 
certainly be more complicated than the simple model presented here. Nevertheless, our 
model shows that the resultant path lengths will be heavy-tailed. 
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Modeling risk due to competition 
In section 0, we considered the simple case where animals in the wild only have to account 
for the passage of time in calculating the temporal discounting. Specifically, we assumed 
that they do not face explicit risks of losing rewards or at least, that they do not model such 
risks. However, this assumption is almost definitely incorrect. In the presence of such 
competition, during the course of a foraging path, the value of a reward might reduce since 
other animals might consume it. Considering such a risk as a stochastic process with a 
mean decay proportional to the magnitude of the reward (i.e. larger rewards are more 
sought after), we showed previously that an appropriate model of risk can be 
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Here, r(start of path) is the reward magnitude at the start of a given path of duration t and 
k and α represent the degree of competition—the larger their values, the more the 
competition. In the time t, the mean reward is expected to have decayed to the value r(after 
path of duration t) as expressed above. As is clear, this introduces another power law form 
to the model expressed in Section 0. Thus, a more complete model of path length 
distribution can be obtained by combining temporal uncertainty (shown in Equation (8)) 
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Here, r can be thought of as the mean reward expected in an environment. 
Statistical characterization of the hyperbolic distribution in Equation (1) 
Rewriting Equation (1) with a proportionality constant k, we get 
 min max( ) ( ) ;p t k c t t t t
      
For this expression to represent a probability distribution, k must have a value such that it 
is normalized over the domain. We first consider the case of continuous data for which the 
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  (12) 
For testing whether observed data is consistent with the probability distribution shown in 
Equation (11), it is important to be able to generate random numbers following that 
distribution. This can be done using inverse transform sampling, provided one has access 
to a uniform random variate u. Inverse transform sampling states that solving for t in the 
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Solving for t, we get 
 
1
1 1 1 1
min max min( ) ( ) ( )t t c t c t c u c
                 (13) 
Equation (13) describes the random number generator for the distribution shown in 
Equation (11) with u being a uniform random variate between 0 and 1. 
( )F t u
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The next question to be addressed is that of parameter estimation for Equation (11) when 
attempting to fit experimental data. This can be done using maximum likelihood estimation 
as shown below. 
Say that we have n independent observations that are assumed to be from the hyperbolic 
distribution in Equation (11). Let the ith observation be ti. Then the likelihood of the data 
given parameters c and µ is:  
 
The log-likelihood is 
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i
t c t c t c             L  
Performing the sums, we get 
1 1
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At the maximum of the log-likelihood function, its partial derivatives with respect to c 
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Thus, we get 
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  (15) 
Equations (14) and (15) have to be numerically solved simultaneously to calculate the 
maximum likelihood estimates for parameters c and µ.  
In practice, this numerical estimation has to be multi-stepped since typical numerical 
solvers only provide local solutions. To ensure that the initial values for numerical solution 
are close to the global solution, we used the following procedure. First, we calculated the 
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pure power law fit to data using the version of Equation (14) with c=0. This is also the ML 
estimator for a pure power law as calculated previously (262) and is shown below. 
1 1
max max min min
1 1
max min
( ) log( ) ( ) log( )1
log( )
1 ( ) ( )
i










  (16) 
Equation (16) also needs to be estimated numerically. The initial value for this solution 
was taken as the ML exponent for a non-truncated power law which has an analytical 
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  (17) 
Once the solution to Equation (16) was obtained, the numerical solution for Equations 
(14) and (15) were calculated using the procedure explained below.  Call µmle for 
Equation (16) as µtp since this is the MLE exponent for a pure truncated power law 
model. The initial values of µ for the numerical solution for Equations (14) and (15) were 
taken as [µtp, µtp+0.05, µtp+0.05,…, µtp+2]. 
The corresponding initial values of c for each of the above mentioned µ was calculated as 
the value that would produce the same median for the truncated hyperbolic distribution as 
the median for the best fit truncated power law with exponent µtp. This is calculated as 
shown below. 
1
1 1 1 1
min max min( ) 0.5( )
mle mle mle mlemedian tp x x x




1 1 1 1
min max min(hyp) ( ) 0.5 ( ) ( )median x c x c x c c
                 (19) 
Equating the above two values and solving for c for each value of µ from the list [µtp, 
µtp+0.05, µtp+0.05,…, µtp+2] provides the appropriate initial point for the numerical 
solution for Equations (14) and (15). However, the above equations need to be solved 
numerically as well. The initial value for this solution was set sequentially. For µ= µtp, the 
initial value for c was taken as zero. The solution to this equation provided the initial value 
for µ= µtp+0.05. The solution for this equation provided the initial value for µ= µtp+0.1 
and so on.  
For each of the above combinations of c and µ as initial values, the corresponding log-
likelihood of the data was calculated. The maximum likelihood c and µ for solving 
Equations (14) and (15) were taken as the pair that maximized the global (against initial 
values for numerical optimization) log-likelihood calculated above. To appropriately 
compare the exponential model to truncated hyperbolic and power law models, it is 
important to use a truncated exponential model. If k is the normalization constant, the 
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Solving for k, we get 
 
Thus the truncated exponential model used for calculating likelihoods is 
(20) 
It is Equation (20) that must be used to calculate Lexp in Equation (5). 
The cumulative distribution function over the truncated domain for the exponential 
distribution can be calculated as 
 
Solving and simplifying, we get 
(21) 
A random number generator for this distribution can again be obtained using inverse 
transform sampling by solving for t in the equation below  
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Solving for t, we get 
(22) 



















L   (23) 
We found the MLE λ by numerically maximizing the above equation. 
 
Discrete distributions 
Since previously collected data (Table 1) also contained discrete data, we derive the above 
procedure for discrete data here. For truncated discrete data, the only difference from the 
above derivation is that the sum of the probability distribution should equal 1, rather than 
the integral. For the truncated hyperbolic model, the appropriate probability distribution 




















The ML estimates of c and µ were calculated by numerically maximizing the log-
likelihood of the data 
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We used the same procedure as described in the above section for global maximization.  
The same equation above was used to estimate the best fit power law distribution by setting 
c=0. 
For a discrete truncated exponential distribution, the probability distribution function can 




















  (24) 
The ML estimate for λ was calculated by maximizing the log-likelihood. It can be shown 
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  (25) 
  
Truncation due to prey encounter 
A curious observation regarding forager path lengths is that they tend to become diffusive 
when food abundance is high (187, 188). While it was previously argued that Brownian 
walks are sufficiently productive under high food density (187, 188), a recent experimental 
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finding demonstrated that such path lengths result from truncation of search due to prey 
encounter (186). A simple theoretical argument provided an explanation for this result. 
However, their calculation was in one-dimension. Here, we extend their argument to search 
in 2-D.  
We first calculate the probability distribution of truncated path lengths. An easy solution 
is to assume that foragers are moving in a straight line until they hit a food item and then 
calculate the resultant path length distribution. We assume that food is homogenously 
distributed with density (number per unit area) ρ. Denote the diameter of the prey (or a 
cluster of prey) as dprey, the CDF of path lengths as F(r), path lengths as r, probability 
density function of path lengths as p(r). Then the infinitesimal change in the CDF, dF(r) 
over a distance dr from r corresponds to the probability that the path length lies between r 
and r+dr. This is equal to the probability that the forager at least moved r (= 1-F(r)) 
multiplied by the probability that the forager hit a target between r and r+dr. The second 
probability can be calculated as the total angle covered by prey in the ring between r and 
r+dr divided by 2π. The total number of foragers (on an average) in this ring equals 2πrdrρ. 
Thus, we can write 
 
If the forager had a sensory diameter of dperc, the above equation would remain exactly the 
same but with the change that dprey would change to dprey+dperc.  
Solving the above equation, we get 
( ) (1 ( )).2 .
2
preyd





Thus the pdf of path lengths is given by 
 
Hence, the prey-truncated path lengths are exponentially distributed. 
If the intended path length distribution (CDF) for exploration was Fintended(r), the 
probability that the path length is at least greater than r is the probability that the intended 
path length is at least greater than r multiplied by the probability that there was no prey-
truncation within r. The latter probability, from Equation (26), is 1-F(r). Thus, the observed 
path lengths would be 
(27) 
Thus, as the density of prey increases, path lengths approach the exponential distribution.  
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